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This paper deals with certain areas and types of research in the fields of
taxation and public expenditure. To make the undertaking practicable,
the coverage has been limited. Broad macro issues concerned with fiscal
policy for full employment, growth, external and internal price equilib-
rium, and the like, are excluded. Moreover, the discussion is restricted
to quantitative research, and hence does not cover theoretical contribu-
tions unaccompanied by quantitative information: for example, Pigou's
A Study in Public Finance, Musgrave's The Theory of Public Finance,
and Buchanan's The Demand and Supply of Public Goods.
Quantitative rather than empirical is the term chosen, in order to
indicate that, at least until very recently, few public finance studies of
facts and figures formulated empirical statements in the sense of refut-
able hypotheses subject to testing by appeal to the facts. Rather, the
facts have been used to suggest hypotheses that have not generally been
tested by appeal to another set of data.1
The present survey excludes all mere compilations of quantitative
descriptions, however essential they may be, if they are not accompanied
by a detailed attempt at interpretation.
A choice had to be made whether to cover the main topics within
the field delimited with about the same intensity, or to select some one
or two parts of the field for special attention, while presenting a type of
1 The distinction drawn here is that made in introductory textbooks: "One
must be very careful to distinguish between the test of a preexisting theory and
the use of observations to suggest a new and still-to-be tested theory." Edward J.
Kane, Economic Statistics and Econometrics. New York, Harper and Row, 1968,
p. 29.
Note: I am indebted to Hal B. Lary and David K. Stout for comments on
an earlier draft of this paper.2 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
summary for others. The latter course has been adopted, the topics
selected for intensive examination of quantitative research being the
distribution of taxation by income classes, and the shifting and incidence
of taxation. These two are, of course, closely related; but, as will be seen,
it has been possible to work in the former area by means of assumptions
concerning the latter one—assumptions grounded, in part, on what the
quantitative studies in shifting and incidence had revealed.
This decision was based on the importance of demonstrating: (1)
the considerable amount of effort that normally has to be devoted to
such a task (involving a fairly long period of time and a number of indi-
viduals) before agreement is reached on the details of technique to be
employed, and apparent conflicts in answers arrived at by different
investigators are either resolved or set aside for still further study; and
(2) the increasing awareness, as the work proceeds, of just what ques-
tion it is that is being answered. This, at least in the first case (distribu-
tion of taxes by income groups), is seen to be far narrower than initially
supposed, though still quite important for policy purposes. The cumula-
tive effect of incremental contributions to technique, the puzzlement
aroused by initial misunderstandings, the methods developed for partial
resolution of disagreements, and the like, can be appreciated only by
working through an amount of detail that, if presented for all the chief
topics in this field, would make the present paper far too long. More-
over, it is a task for which probably no one person in public finance is
fitted.
The remaining topics, labeled 11-C through III-J, are discussed
chiefly in terms of the present state of quantitative knowledge.
Part IV offers a few observations in addition to—or in summary
of—statements in Parts II and III with respect to future trends in quan-
titative research in taxation and governmental expenditure.
Part V attempts a broader, looser analysis of the role of quanti-
tative studies in these fields in formulation of public policy.
It will be seen that even the list of topics that are treated but briefly
(Il-C through III-J) excludes many sectors in which important quantita-
tive studies have been made. In particular, the tax effects that are
covered in this list are chiefly those that directly concern The business
world, rather than households.2 This somewhat arbitrary selection would
2Consequently,among the many significant quantitative studies that are not
covered here, are some of those published recently by The Brookings Institution,
including Economic Behavior of the Affluent, by Robin Barlow, Harvey E. Brazer,
and James N. Morgan (1966); Alternative Approaches to Capital Gains Taxation,Public Expenditures and Taxation 3
not have been acceptable had the aim of the present paper been ency-
clopedic. As it stands, however, the main issues of quantitative analysis in
taxation and government expenditure seem well enough exemplified by
the topics that have been included.
II. TAXATION
A. Distribution of Taxation by Income Levels or Classes, or Other
Categories
The most popular quantitative exercise in public finance has been to
distribute taxation by income classes. A few of such studies have included
estimates of the distribution of benefits from government services, but
they have been so rough as to be rather uninteresting, except, perhaps,
the Adler study (see footnote 16 below). Distributions of taxation by
family size are sometimes made; other types of distribution are rare.
Any one tax-distribution table, taken by itself, is of limited signifi-
cance since—for reasons to be adduced below—it does not really say
what it seems to say. Studies of two or more alternative tax systems do
say something quite useful; it is meaningful to think of an existing tax
system being supplanted by another, while it is meaningless to think of an
existing tax system being replaced by nothing.
In these tax-distribution studies, one of two techniques has been
employed: the typical-family technique or the total-tax-bill technique.
The typical-family technique uses the tax law, but no tax collection
data. Given a family's consumption and income levels and patterns, the
tax rates can be applied, with appropriate assumptions about incidence
as contrasted with initial impact, to yield a tax bill for that family.
Similar data are given for other similarly specified families at other in-
come levels.
In contrast, the total-tax-bill technique uses tax collection data
and does not require information on tax rates, tax bases, and the like.
It allocates total personal income-tax revenue to income groups: for ex-
ample, $2 billion of income tax revenue is ascertained to be paid by all
taxpayers (married or single, and regardless of number of children) of
families with incomes from above ten-thousand to twelve-thousand dol-
by Martin David (1968); Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, by Harold M.
Groves (1963); Trusts and Estate Taxation, by Gerald R. Jantscher (1967); and
Consumer Responses to Income increases, by George Katona and Eva Mueller
(1968).4 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
lars, their aggregate income being $30 billion. Total tobacco-tax reve-
nue is allocated among income groups under assumptions, or studies,
of relative amounts of tobacco consumed in the several income groups,
and assumptions about the degree of forward shifting of this tax. In
recent years, almost all of the distribution studies have utilized the total-
tax-bill technique.
To my knowledge, the earliest study that covered all of the taxes of
the central government was that prepared by the Coiwyn Commission
in the United Kingdom, in 1927, using the typical-family technique.
It thus extended the scope of the otherwise similar study by Lord
Samuel (released in 1919, for the years 1903—4, 1913—14, and 1918—
19), which had not dealt with income taxes.4 In addition to its pioneer-
ing work, this tax-distribution study was notable for stimulating review
articles by Keynesand Robertson,6 the former commendatory, the
latter critical.
The earliest tax-distribution study of an entire tax system made in
the United States is apparently the one published in the Report of the
New York State Commission for the Revision of the Tax Laws,
which used the typical-family method to distribute state and local taxes
(not federal taxes) imposed in New York State. The state taxeswere on
motor fuel, operator's license (fee), motor vehicles (registration), in-
3Reportof the Committee on National Debt and Taxation. Cmd. 2800. 1927.
4H.Samuel, "The Taxation of the Various Classes of the People," Journal
of the Royal StatisticalSociety, LXXXII,March, 1919, pp. 144—82. See also, for
post-Coiwyn studies, D. C. Jones, "Pre-War and Post-War Taxation," Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Part IV, XC, 1927, pp. 685—718, and D. M. Sandral,
"The Burden of Taxation on the Various Classes of the Community," Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Part I, XCIV, 1931, pp. 83—94.
5J.M. Keynes, "The Coiwyn Report on National Debt and Taxation,"
Economic Journal, June, 1927, pp. 198—212. Keynes' article reproduces in full the
Committee's detailed table of distribution of national-government taxes by income
levels, for each of five years, ranging from 1903—1904 to 1925—1926; and by tax:
all for a married taxpayer with three children under sixteen, Ibid., pp. 200—201.
6Robertsonwas unhappy [correctly so] over the model of corporate behavior
devised by W. H. Coates, in which income tax could not "enter into price"; and
tested by Coates against data on profit margins. But whatever the faults of Coates'
procedure, he deserves credit for being the first [and also the last, apparently!] to
construct a model, however crude, in connection with his tax-distribution study,
and to attempt to test it. D. H. Robertson, "The Coiwyn Committee, the Income
Tax and the Price Level," Economic Journal (Dec., 1927), pp. 566—81.Reprinted
in his Economic Fragments. London, King & Son, 1931.
Legislative Document (1932) No. 77, State of New York, "Part Two, Re-
port Submitted to the Commission by Robert Murray Haig," pp. 9 1—100.Public Expenditures and Taxation 5
surance, stock transfer, mortgage recording, personal income, estates,
banks, corporation income (franchise), utility companies, and (local)
real estate. This study's estimates of taxes paid directly or indirectly by
a specified family (four families were specified) were decidedly impres-
sionistic; but it did face up, if only briefly, to problems of allocation of
taxes on long-lived assets (tax capitalization), on insurance contracts,
on estates, on corporate income, on business real estate—as distinct
from residential real estate—and on that portion of the property that
could be labeled land.
The next detailed tax-distribution study,8 and apparently the first
in any country to include taxes of all levels of government, was that by
Professor Mabel Newcomer in the Twentieth Century Fund research
project of The Newcomer study also broke new ground by com-
puting a family's tax bill, direct and indirect, as a percentage of poten-
tial income rather than of recorded pretax income, and by comparing
results under five series of assumptions about (a) shifting and incidence
and (b) intrafamily changes in property ownership induced by tax pro-
visions. Potential income is the income the family would have received
in the absence of the tax system; for example, increased dividend income
in the absence of a corporation income tax, and decreased income from
land in the absence of an already capitalized land tax.'° As did Coates,
8Abrief updating and expansion of the New York State computations, this
time using budget data for families from the United States Department of Labor,
as found in "Depression Taxes and Economy through Reform of Local Govern-
ment: Third Report of the New York State Commission for Revision of the Tax
Laws" (Luther Gulick, Director of Research). Legislative Document No. 56
(1933), pp. 21—23. A detailed study of the distribution of property and income
taxes was given by Harold Groves in his Ability to Pay and the Tax System in
Dane County. Wisconsin, Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Bureau of
Business and Economic Research, No. 2.
0ResearchDirector, Carl Shoup; Associate Directors, Roy Blough and Mabel
Newcomer, Studies in Current Tax Prob!e,ns. New York, Twentieth Century Fund,
1937.
10Witha given dollar capital to invest in land, the buyer gets less pretax in-
come from his investment if there is no tax, since the price of land is corre-
spondingly higher. Or, as Professor Newcomer put it, "In deducting the amount
of [the annual payments for the] capitalized land tax [from actual income, to
arrive at potential it has been assumed that the higher price that would
have been paid [for an unchanged amount of land] if there had been no tax on
land would have reduced the taxpayers' investments in securities, and therefore
their incomes, by a corresponding amount." Mabel Newcomer, "Estimate of the
Tax Burden on Different Income Classes," in Shoup, Blough and Newcomer, op.
cit., p. 31.6 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
Newcomer limited her study to a one-size family: a married couple with
two minor children. Computations were made for ten representative
families with actual income ranging from five-hundre4 dollars to $1
million annually, distributed over six occupations, but assumed to be as
much alike with respect to consumption patterns as was consistent with
the differences in income and activity. Two geographic settings were
employed, and the results compared: New York State (outside of New
York City) and Illinois. The former state depended heavily upon the
income tax; the latter, upon the general sales tax. As noted above, in
each instance five alternative sets of assumptions were used regarding
the shifting of certain taxes, and concerning the division of ownership of
property between. spouses (important for computing the family income-
tax bill). Thus, for any one income level, ten alternative answers were
obtained (two states, five sets of assumptions of the kind just noted).
In its wealth of detail regarding the assumptions made and the
reasons for selecting them, the Newcomer study remains a useful source
for anyone who is engaged in studies of tax distribution.'1
11Thefindings of the Newcomer study were summarized in Carl Shoup, Roy
Blough, and Mabel Newcomer, Facing the Tax Problem. New York, Twentieth
Century Fund, 1937, Ch. 17. For details of the sets of assumptions, see Newcomer,
op. cit., p. 11. ". ..thesmallest burden under any conditions is estimated to be
8 per cent of potential income, for one of the Illinois farm families, and the
largest exceeds 100 per cent, in the extreme case of a corporation official where
the family has an actual income of $1,000,000 but no steps are taken to distribute
the income or property among members of the family in order to lessen income or
death taxes [and 'where]...thefamily attempts to keep the property intact, on
the death of the head of the family, through insurance sufficient to cover death
taxes....Allthe estimates indicate that the tax burden is regressive for those
in income classes not subject to income and death taxes. This regressivity is largely
due to the assumptions that the ratio of expenditures to income is greater for
small incomes than for large incomes and that the rate 'of assessment [for real
estate taxiis higher for small properties than for large properties.... Com-
paring the difference in estimated burdens under the different series of assumptions
[concerning the shifting of taxes and pattern of ownership of property and income
within the family], it is perhaps surprising to find that radical differences in assump-
tions result in comparatively small changes in [tax] burdens in most instances..
.."
Shoup,Blough, and Newcomer, op. cit., pp. 23 1—32, 232—34, and 235, respectively.
The median figure (of the five figures resulting from the five sets of assumptions)
for total tax burden, federal, state, and local, as a percentage of the potential in-
come, was, for New York: Farmers: $500, 15.0; $1,000, 11.4; $2,000, 9.8. Wage
earners: $1,000, 17.6; $2,000,16.4. Salaried worker: $5,000, 20.8. Merchant:
$5,000, 24.5. Salaried worker: $20,000, 31.6. Corporation officials: $100,000, 44.3;
$1,000,000, 84.5. For Illinois families, the respective percentages (medians) are:
12.7, 10.4, 9.2, 16.9, 15.9, 19.3, 40.7 (sic), 27.7, 39.9, and 81.0. Ibid., Table 26,
p. 232.Public Expenditures and Taxation 7
The next step, transition from the typical-family technique to the
total-tax-bill technique, first appeared in published form 12inan article
by Robert R. Pettengill,13 who blew up the Newcomer findings into a
national aggregate set of figures, and in so doing, reached a tax revenue
total close to the estimated actual total.
The second published study of this type took the actual total of tax
revenue—federal, state, and local—and allocatedit among income
groups (Who Pays the Taxes? written under the supervision of Gerhard
Coim, by Helen Tarasov 14)Themost striking difference from the find-
ings of the Newcomer study concerned the lowest income group (lowest
income level, in Newcomer). Colm-Tarasov found 21.9 per cent of the
zero-to-$500 income group's average income of $346 going in taxes,
against Newcomer's range of 11.2 per cent to 15.6 per cent for nine of
her ten families with $500 income (the tenth showed 19.1 per cent).
The difference in percentages is probably explained partly by the differ-
ences in income level. The remaining difference is explained partly by
techniques of computation.'5
In another thoughtful monograph in this area, John H. Adler 16
presenteda United States federal-state-local tax distribution for 1946—
47, together with a distribution of the benefits of government services
12Dr.Louis Shere had completed a more elaborate study of this type for the
federal government in 1935, which was not published.
13"Divisionof the Tax Burden Among Income Groups in the United States
in 1936," American Economic Review, XXX, 1940, pp. 60—71.
14TemporaryNational Economic Committee, Monograph No. 3, 1941 (vii,
55 pp.), Washington, D.C.
15Fora critique written at that time, see the review of the Colm-Tarasov
study by Carl Shoup, Review of Economics and Statistics, Feb., 1942, Pp. 36—41.
Tarasov later revised the study and updated it to 1941, without appreciable change
in the findings: "Who Does Pay the Taxes?" Supplement [V to Social Research,
1942 (xiii + 49 pp.), Introduction by Jacob Marschak. Newcomer distributed to
consumers only the nonland part of the business property tax, and distributed that
part in the ratio that cash income bore to national income, instead of in the ratio
that expenditures bore to the total of consumer expenditures. These two facts
account for 3.5 percentage points of the difference. The absence of a sales tax in
New York State (excluding New York City) explained another 2 percentage
points for that part of the Newcomer study dealing with New York (but not, of
course, for the part dealing with Illinois, where the difference was that much
smaller to begin with, since Illinois did impose a sales tax). Most of the rest of the
difference could not be explained, owing to a lack of published detail in the Coim-
Tarasov study.
16"TheFiscal System, the Distribution of Income, and Public Welfare,"
Chapter VIII in Kenyon E. Poole, Fiscal Policies and the American Economy.
New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951.8 Economic Research: Retrospect arid Prospect
and transfer payments for that year. In addition, this work linked up
with the Tarasov study for 1938—39. Adler's tax findings for 1946—47
did not differ materially from those of Tarasov. On the expenditures
side, his distribution employed a number of allocators. Veterans' benefits
were allocated equally among all consumer units below $5,000 ($2,000
for 1938—39); social security benefits and housing expenditures, equally
to those below $4,000 ($2,000 in 1938—39); agricultural benefits, in
proportion to income distribution among farmers; means-test expendi-
tures (relief, medical), inversely to income below $4,000 ($2,500 in
1938—39); interest payments, on the basis of liquid asset holdings;
police, fire, and other protection outlays, on the basis of real property
holdings; educational expenditures, per capita; public works and road
outlays, proportional to income; military, executive-office, and other
miscellaneous expenditures, also proportional to income.17
Combining his tax and government service-and-payments alloca-
tions, Adler concluded that the fiscal system as a whole was progressive
for both of those years. The interpretation was necessarily blurred by
the fact that in 1938—39 the government sector operated at a substantial
deficit, while in 1946—47 it showed a surplus, so that, in the earlier year,
total benefits received exceeded taxes paid and, in the later year, fell
short of taxes. Adler's discussion only partly resolved this troublesome
conceptual issue. In any event, the lower-income groups either gained
more, or lost less—in percentage terms—from the existence of a fiscal
system than did the upper-income groups. But, of course, these methods
of reckoning do not venture to suggest what the country would be like
without any government at all, in which case the rich would probably be
relatively better off than the poor, at least as long as they remained rich
in a chaotic society.
To return to tax distributions, the most elaborate study of all
appeared in the National Tax Journal for March, 1951 (pp. 1—53):
"Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for
1948," by R. A. Musgrave, J. J.. Carroll, L. D. Cook, and L. Frane.
This Musgrave study [as we shall call it] startled some of its readers by
its extraordinary figure of 28.1 per cent of the income of those in the
under-$1,000 class being taken in taxation (16.5 federal, 5.8 state, 5.8
local), compared with 24.3 per cent for the $1,000—under-$2,000 class,
and 29.2 per cent for all income groups together.18 The federal corpora-
tion income tax accounted for 7.3 points out of the 28.1, under Mus-
17 Ibid., pp. 3 84—87.
ibid.,Table 6, p. 26.Public Expenditures and Taxation 9
grave's "standard assumption" (Case A) that one-third of the tax was
shifted forward to consumers, one-eighth backward to wage earners,
with the rest burdening the shareholders.
Rufus S. Tucker, in an elaborate critique of Musgrave, concluded
that the $0—$1,000 group paid only 18.7 per cent of their income in
taxes, instead of 28.1 per cent.1° Substantial comments on Musgrave
appeared later, in an article by Gerhard Coim and Haskell Wald,2° along
with a Musgrave-Frane rejoinder to Dr. Tucker, a rebuttal by Tucker,
and a concluding note by Musgrave and Frane.2' Anyone who wants to
become acquainted with the chief conceptual and computational pitfalls
in this area will benefit from a study of this sheaf of excellent analyses.
The chief reason for the differences in findings for the lowest income
group turned out to be not so much the differing assumptions about tax
shifting, but the alternative definitions of income classes by money
income and by money plus imputed income (not including, however,
imputed income from work in the home).
Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, G. Findlay Shirras and L.
Rostas had published in 1943 22 a detailed tax-distribution study for
1937—38 and for the early war period; but they, as had their predeces-
sors, omitted "rates" (local real estate taxes). Tibor Barna's monu-
mental study for the year 1937,23 published in 1945, not only included
rates (distributed, as rates on dwellings, in proportion to expenditure on
rent; and as rates on business, by type of business, thence to consumers
by budget-study data), but also, for the first time,24 a distribution of the
benefits of government transfer payments and services. A few years later
Allan M. Cartter published a similar study for postwar Britain.25
Several more tax-distribution studies and, less frequently, expendi-
ture-distribution studies were made in the 1950's and 1960's; but they
Rufus S. Tucker, "Distribution of Tax Burdens in 1948," National Tax
Journal(Sept.,1951),pp.269—85.
20NationalTax Journal (March,1952), pp. 1—14.
21 Ibid., pp. 15—35, pp. 36—3 8, and p. 39, respectively.
22 The Burden of British Taxation. New York, Macmillan, 1943.
23 Redistribution 0/ Incomes through the Fiscal System in 1937. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1945. For expenditure distribution, see pp. 76—84, pp. 195—213.
24 Excepting the somewhat incidental reckoning made by Cohn Clark, in
National Income and Outlay. London, Macmillan, 1938 (cited by Adler, op. cit.,
p. 365). In 1950, Hubert Brochier's Finances Publiques et Redistribution des
Revenus (Paris, Armand-Colin), presenteda tax-expenditure distributionfor
France.
25 A. M. Cartter, TheDistributionofIncome in Post-WarBritain. New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1952.10 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
will be cited only briefly here, for the essential issues had already been
isolated in the formative period extending roughly from 1920 to 1950.20
Tucker went on to distribute government benefits.27 Musgrave made a
study of 1954 data for the Joint Committee.28 George A. Bishop utilized
the Department of Commerce series on size distribution of family per-
sonal-income to distribute the 1958 tax bill.20 Some studies of state tax-
systems have distributed state and local taxes in those states.3° The
Council of Economic Advisers included in its Annual Report, dated
January, a chart distributing—among seven income groups—
federal, and state-local taxes; and separately, transfer payments. The
rates of tax computed as a percentage of income differ markedly from
those of slightly earlier studies. The Council Report makes no reference
to such studies. The difference arises chiefly, it appears, because income
is here defined to exclude transfer payments. Those with income under
$2,000 (defined in this fashion) are said to have received $16,622 mil-
lion income in 1965, and, in addition, $21,025 million in transfer pay-
ments. Total taxes for 1965 allocated to this group of people were
$7,296 million ($3.1 billion, federal; $4.1 billion, state and local). These
26 Tax-distribution studies for countries other than the United States, in addi-
tion to those already noted, include:I.J. Goffman, The Burden of Canadian
Taxation. Toronto, Canadian Tax Foundation, 1962, and "Incidence of Taxation
in Canada," Public Finance, No.1(1964); F. D. Holzman, "The Burden of
Soviet Taxation," American Economic Review (Sept., 1953); K. W. Roskamp,
"The Distribution of Tax Burden in a Rapidly Growing Economy: West Germany
in 1950," National Tax Journal (March, 1963); 0. Zeitel. Die Steuerlast in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (TUbingen, 1959); H. F. Lydall, "The Long-Term
Trend in the Size Distribution of Income," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
(122, 1959), pp. 1—36; Merrett and Monk, "The Structure of U.K. Taxation,
1962—63," Bulletin of the Oxford University institute of Economics and Statistics
(Aug., 1966), and the Central Statistical Office's occasional articles on the effect
of direct and indirect taxes and benefits on income distribution, published in the
monthlyjournal EconomicTrends (London); see, e.g., the August, 1966, issue.
"The Distribution of Government Burdens and Benefits," American Eco-
nomic Review (May, 1953), pp. 518—34.
28 "The Incidence of the Tax Structure and Its Effects on Consumption";
"Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability." Panelists' Papers, Sub-
co,nmiuee on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic Report (Nov. 9,
1955), pp. 96—113.
"The Tax Burden by Income Class, 1958," National Tax Journal (March,
1961),pp. 41—58.
30See note33 below.
Economic Report of the President (Jan., 1969), together with The Annual
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. Superintendent of Documents, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1969, p. 161.Public Expenditures and Taxation 11
taxes, stated as a percentage of income defined to exclude the transfer
payments, came to 43.9 per cent of income—a far higher figure than
that shown by any of the earlier studies. For this group, taxes less trans-
fer payments came to minus 82.6 per cent of income, defined as
noted.32 If these taxes were computed as a percentage of income includ-
ing transfer payments, the 43.9 per cent figure would drop to 19.4 per
cent.
Under the Council's method of computing taxes as a percentage of
income, a family with no income—but receiving transfer payments—
would be shown to be paying taxes equal to an indefinitely large per-
centage of its "income"; and this would be so, no matter bow small the
absolute amount of these taxes. The advantages of this method of pre-
sentation are at least arguable. In any event, one may hope that in future
computations of this kind the Council will not state its quantitative find-
ings so briefly, and almost casually; for here, with only one chart and no
tables, conclusions are presented which are not only potentially explosive
politically and socially, but which, at the same time, give the impression
of being at variance with the long line of earlier quantitative studies.
The extent to which a particular taxing jurisdiction—a state in the
United States, for instance, or a city in one of the states—might be ex-
porting its tax bill to households and firms located elsewhere was largely,
if not entirely, ignored in studies cited up to this point, as was also the
amount of taxation that might be imported. These questions were faced
in the late 1950's, and in the 1960's, in studies of the distribution of
state tax systems, where the relative importance of the open-economy
element induced analysis of tax exporting and tax importing.33 The most
32 The Council Report itself presents no tabular material or reference to
sources. The data here are based on the 11 pages of mimeographed material that
the Council sends to those of its readers who wish to obtain a description, upon
request, of the "data from a variety of sources," on which the chart is based. This
document is entitled "Background and Basic Assumptions of Tax-Transfer Chart
Data (p. 161 of 1969 Annual Report)," by David J. Ott. Joseph A. Pechman, in
his The Rich, the Poor, and the Taxes They Pay, Public Interest, No. 17 (Fall,
1969: reprint available from Brookings), presents, on p. 33, an abbreviation of
Ott's Table 3, which is the basis for the chart in the Council's Report.
See 0. H. Brownlee, Estimated Distribution of Minnesota Taxes and Public
Expenditures. Minneapolis, 1960; T. F. Hady, "The Incidence of the Personal
Property Tax," Narional Tax Journal (Dec.,1962), pp. 368—84; Edwin W.
Hanczaryk and James H. Thompson, The Economic Impact of the State and Local
Taxes in West Virginia. Morgantown, West Va., West Virginia Bureau of Business
Research, 1958; F. H. Jackson, Tax Burden and the Hawaiian Tax System. Hono-
lulu, 1960; M. S. Kendrick and F. H. Jackson, Economic Impact of Tax Reduc-12 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
comprehensive and detailed analysis of this aspect of the tax-distribution
problem was that put forward by Charles E. McLure, Jr.34 McLure
examined the open economies of the states of the United States, and
imputed "the shares of the various taxes falling upon each group to the
states of residence of its members.... Weassume certain effects of the
taxes upon prices of products [given competitive conditions in an open
economy] and factors (price effects), and then on the basis of the
residency of those experiencing those price effects, allocate the taxes to
residents and nonresidents of the taxing state."He found that "For
the nation as a whole $10.2 billion or 25 percent of all state and local
taxes collected in 1962 were borne by non-residents of the taxing state,
according to our short-run analysis. In the long-run, $8.3 billion or 20
percent were exported."
McLure recognized the need to use differential incidence, employ-
ing as his other tax, a hypothetical tax—or rather, tax system—postu-
lated to be borne entirely by residents of the taxing state. For this pur-
pose, he selected a (hypothetical) income tax levied on a residence
basis, on the assumption that residence mobility is not high.37
Some conjectures will now be offered here regarding fruitful paths
for future research in tax distribution, and in distribution of government
transfer payments and services.
First, it would be advisable to break down the lowest income group
into two subgroups: those who are probably there to stay for some time;
and those who, because of their age level, or because of temporary diffi-
culties, may not be found there the following year—or, at least, not in
the second or third year—students, temporarily unemployed skilled
workers, small businessmen having a bad year, and (depending on the
tion. Honolulu, 1960; William E. Koenkner and Glenn W. Fisher, Tax Equity in
North Dakota.Universityof North Dakota, 1960; Richard A. Musgrave and
Darwin W. Daicoff, "Who Pays the Michigan Taxes?" in Michigan Study Staff
Papers. Lansing, Michigan, 1958; University of Wisconsin, Tax Study Commit-
tee, Wisconsin's State and Local Tax Burden. Madison, Wisconsin, 1959.
"An Analysis of Regional Tax Incidence, with Estimation of Interstate
Incidence of State and Local Taxes." Princeton University, Doctoral Dissertation,
1966. University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan (viii + 376 pp.). See also his
"Tax Exporting in the United States: Estimates for 1962," in National Tax Journal
(March, 1967), pp. 49—77, and "Commodity Tax Incidence in Open Economies,"
National Tax Journal (June, 1964).
"An Analysis of Regional Tax Incidence...," p.10. (See above.)
36 Ibid., p. 312.
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questions the distribution is designed to answer) those with a life ex-
pectancy of only a year or so.
The U-shaped distribution curve, found in virtually every tax-
distribution study, came to be expected early in this research, since the
lowest-income group obviously contained some transients whose only
future direction was up (or out, for the very elderly), and who, mean-
while, would normally be outspending their low incomes. And it may
well be that the data for the next one or two higher-income classes are
similarly ambiguous. Far preferable, but more difficult to implement,
would be a study using a time period longer than a year.
Second, the imputed income of housewives should be entered along
with other imputed (and untaxed) income and expenditure. Even a
rough guess would be better than continuing to accede to the natural
desire of national-income estimators to avoid so conjectural a figure.38
Third, those who construct such tax-distribution tables (including
myself) should be more cautious, more limited, in their interpretations
of what the tables show. Taken literally, one such table, standing by
itself, purports to inform the reader by how much the aggregate dispos-
able income of each income class would increase if all the taxes were
repealed, and nothing else were done. But, of course, something else
would have to be done: substitute taxes imposed, inflation financing
adopted, government itself abolished. It is somewhat as if we computed
the wages-bill cost of everything we consume, and showed that bill as a
"burden," varying by income class, depending on how consumption pat-
terns of rich and poor differ in the mix of capital-intensive goods which
they consume, and in the proportion of income devoted to consumption.
No one such table by itself could be of much use.
Nonetheless, a single-tax distribution table can be a starting point
for a fruitful analysis. A change in the tax system can be postulated, and
by a priori reasoning (a macromodel, specified as best as may be from
a multitude of data from the past) some conjectures can be reached
concerning a consequent change in distribution of real disposable-
income, by income classes. Even here, caution is required. The aggre-
gate pretax income falling in any one income class will almost surely not
be the same in the second table, owing to changes in remuneration,
38 Something much better than a rough guess is in prospect, thanks to the
workunder way atthe National Bureau of Economic Research, by John W.
Kendrick, Nancy Ruggles and Richard Ruggles, Elizabeth Simpson Wehle, and
Harold Wolozin. (See National Bureau of Economic Research, Annual Report,
June, 1968, pp. 64—66; and June, 1969, p. 56.)14 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
hours of work, supply of capital, and similar variables—changes induced
by the postulated alteration of the tax system. Moreover, many indi-
viduals (or households) will be in a different pretax income class under
the second tax system.
Still, the dangers of drastic errors of interpretation are probably
not so great as to invalidate 'broad conclusions drawn from such com-
parisons of two or more tax-distribution tables. (The same remarks
apply, of course, to tables that include distribution of transfer payments
and the value of free government services.) What must be resisted is the
simple kind of declaration, unaccompanied by any statement of alterna-
tives, that a single such table demonstrates that, say, 20 per cent of the
income of the lowest income-group is taken in taxes. The meaning and
significance of such a statement are obscure.
In sum, the studies of tax burden by income classes, and by geo-
graphic areas, are of great economic and social significance, and the long
history of their construction is an important chapter in quantitative
research in public finance. However, in my opinion, interpretation of the
results thus gained needs revision from that common in the past.39 To
30 See Carl S. Shoup, Public Finance. Chicago, Aldine, 1969, pp. 7—15. Pro-
fessor Musgrave offered a penetrating analysis of this issue in his 1951 article:
"The reader may wonder why, after having defined the concept of burden in
section 2 in terms of absolute money burden, we conducted the discussion in sec-
tiOn 3 in terms of changes in the distribution of the money burden which result
when one tax system is substituted for another. Would it not have been simpler to
compare income net of tax under the given tax structure with income net of tax
in the absence of taxes and thus determine the absolute burden distribution of
the given tax structure? Unfortunately, this cannot be done, for the simple reason
that taxes are the counterpart of public expenditures....Ina situation where,
to begin with, we have public expenditures as well as taxes, we cannot 'think the
existing taxes away'—to borrow Wicksell's terms—without either(a)thinking
public expenditures away as well, or (b) substituting some alternative means of
finance....Intax determination, the distribution of the money burden is of
primary importance. But, if we wish to study the incidence of taxation as such, it
must be recognized that this incidence cannot be thought of in absolute terms; an
alternative means of finance must be substituted when the prevailing taxes are
'thought away,' and this means that the result will necessarily be in differential
terms." R. A. Musgrave, J. J. Carroll, L. D. Cook and L. Franc, bc. cit., pp. 6—8.
See also the excellent analysis by Alan R. Prest, "The Budget and Interpersonal
Distribution," in Public Finance, XXIII, 1968 (No. 1—2), pp. 80—98, and "Com-
ment" by Karl W. Roskamp, pp. 99—105.
In Norway, the Central Bureau of Statistics issued on Aug. 19, 1965, a re-
port entitled Statistical Tax Incidence Investigation, 1960, cast entirely in terms of
differential tax incidence. The hypothetical tax used as a basis for comparison
with the existing system of Norwegian direct taxes, indirect taxes, price subsidies,Public Expenditures and Taxation 15
accomplish this will require considerable self-restraint. It implies, for
example, as the section below makes clear, that no broad-based tax can
be said to have an incidence (as distinguished from its impact) of its
own; it has only a differential incidence relative to some other public-
finance measure.
The differential approach is taken naturally in those studies that
appraise the structure of one particular tax and ask how some specified
change in that structure—a change that would leave unaltered the yield
of that tax—would affect the distribution of tax liability by income class,
or by some other grouping. Or, short of this, they compute the revenue
loss or gain to come from a certain structural change, and at least imply
which of the income groups could not reasonably be called upon to
make good the gap or be allowed to participate in the surplus, in view
of the purpose behind the structural change.4°
B. Shifting and Incidence of Taxes
In contrast to the quantitative work on tax and expenditure dis-
tribution, that on shifting and incidence has but recently entered its most
and social security contributions was a simple proportional income tax. "The
differential tax shows how much worse (if the differential tax is negative: better)
individual household groups were situated in 1960 as compared to how they
would have been situated lithe hypothetical tax system had been enforced. The
comparison thus gives us a relative tax incidence." ("English summary," p. 83.)
It was assumed that "the price a household pays for a consumer good is changed
by an amount that equals the change in indirect taxes (less price subsidies) per
unit" and that "the disposable income of the household would have been changed
by an amount that equals the change in direct taxes (less transfers to the house-
hold from the government)" (p. 84). Further changes that might be expected
from "various repercussions that a change in tax system will bring upon the econ-
omy through changes in the behaviour of individual households and firms" could
not be taken into account in the absence of a comprehensive economic model.
This report was the work of Mr. Arne Øien, who received aid and advice pri-
marily from Professors Cary Brown and Leif Johansen, and from Per Sevaldson.
From my point of view, this is precisely the kind of approach that should be
used in tax distribution studies; it is to be hoped that this Norwegian study will
serve as a model for future work in this field, though the particular hypothetical
tax or tax system to be used as a base for comparison will, of course, vary with
the circumstances.
4°Somany empirical studies of this type have been published that it would
be difficult to attempt to record them here, but a notable recent example consists
of the sections relevant to this point in Lawrence H. Seltzer, The Personal Exemp-
tions in the Income Tax. National Bureau of Economic Research. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1968.16 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
interesting and puzzling stage, which, in this case,is the attempt to
measure the degree of shifting, if any, of broad-based taxes—notably,
the corporate income tax—by econometric analysis. Earlier quantitative
studies had been concerned with narrowly based which can
be usefully studied in a simple partial-equilibrium framework by observa-
tion of immediate changes in prices.42 To be sure, there had been at least
two attempts to ascertain the incidence of broad-based taxes, but neither
one had employed sophisticated techniques. One was the study—flawed
in its reasoning but imaginatively mounted—by Coates for the Coiwyn
Commission in The other was the analysis of the incidence of the
processing taxes of the 1930's in the United States, where an unexpected
Supreme Court nullification of the taxes on January 6, 1936, had pro-
duced a clean break in a time series of prices and processing-cost mar-
gins, and so enabled a post hoc approach to achieve an apparently high
degree of reliability." These taxes had been imposed on thefirst
domestic processing of wheat, cotton, hogs, and six other "basic agricul-
tural commodities," under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12,
1933; the actual introduction of the several taxes occurred in 1933,
1934, or 1935. The taxes were obviously intended to be shifted by the
processors.45
Following nullification of the taxes, Congress included in the Reve-
nue Act of 1936 a provision that processing taxes paid by the processors
could be reclaimed by them, as refunds, only upon proof that they had
failed to shift the tax. Certain firms that had benefited by others' shifting,
without themselves having paid the tax, were made subject to an "un-
just enrichment tax." In reaching decisions on cases brought before
them, the United States courts were aided by the study cited in footnote
41 See Oswald Brownlee and George L. Perry, "The Effects of the 1965 Fed-
eral Excise Tax Reductions on Prices," National Tax Journal (Sept., 1967); John
F. Due, "The Effect of the 1954 Reduction of Federal Excise Taxes upon the
List Prices of Electrical Appliances: a Case Study," National Tax Journal (Sept.,
1954); Harry L. Johnson, "Tax Pyramiding and the Manufacturer's Excise Tax
Reduction of 1954," National Tax Journal (Sept., 1964). See also note 50 below.
42 Carl S. Shoup, Public Finance, pp. 9—10.
43 Appendices to the Report of the Commission on National Debt and Taxa-
tion, pp. 65—113. (See notes 3, 5, and 6 in Section lI-A above.)
Bureau of Internal Revenue, United States Treasury Dept., An Analysis
of the Effects of the Processing Taxes Levied under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act. Washington, 1937. The study was made by the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture.
See Wirth F. Ferger, "The Measurement of Tax Shifting: Economics and
the Law," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May, 1940), p. 431.Public Expenditures and Taxation 17
44. The findings of that study are too complex to be summarized ade-
quately here, but in general, they indicated that the processors had in-
deed shifted the taxes. For example, upon initiation of the processing
tax on wheat, the spread between the weekly price of wheat per bushel
in Minneapolis and the value of the milled products obtained from a
bushel of wheat (which had fluctuated only moderately in the preceding
two years) rose at once so that the margin, after allowing for the tax,
remained unchanged. When the tax was removed, in January 1936, the
margin immediately declined by the full amount of the tax.4° These mar-
gin changes did not, of course, show whether the taxes were shifted
forward or backward.47
Other studies based on time series (made at various times and
places) that were designed primarily to obtain information on aspects
other than incidence, included some findings on apparent, very short-run
incidence.48' 49
The studies referred to in note 41 above found that reductions or
repeal of federal excise taxes in 1954, a.nd in 1965, were promptly fol-
lowed by reductions in suggested or actual retail prices of the commod-
ities or services affected, commonly by an amount roughly equivalent to
the tax reduction with a loading for tax pyramiding; i.e., applying a per-
centage markup to sales price including tax. But there were enough de-
partures from this outcome to render impracticable here a brief sum-
mary of the results observed.50
46 Wirth F. Ferger, "Windfall Tax and Processing Tax Refund Provisions of
the 1936 Revenue Act," American Economic Review (1937), p. 54.
Other types of studies had to be made to attack this problem; they indi-
cated that most of the wheat and cotton processing taxes had been shifted forward,
while a large part of the hog tax had been shifted backward. Ferger, op. cit., p.
56, and sources there cited, e.g., Geoffrey Shepherd, "Incidence of the Processing
Tax on Hogs," Journal of Farm Economics (May, 1935).
See Robert Murray Haig and Carl Shoup, with the assistance of Reavis
Cox, Louis Shere, and Edwin H. Spengler, The Sales Tax in the A merican States.
New York, Columbia University Press, 1934, pp. 64—80, and Index, "Shifting."
For much earlier studies, see references to Mildschuh (rentals tax in
Prague); Laspeyres and Schott (milling and slaughtering taxes in Prussia); and
Heliwig (Hessian octrois on flour and bread) in Otto von Mering, The Shifting
and Incidence of Taxation. Philadelphia, Blakiston, 1942, pp. 7—8; and Horst Claus
Recktenwald, Steueruberwiilzungslehre. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1966, p. 70.
50Seeespecially the findings of F. 0. Woodward and Harvey Seigelman,
"Effects of the 1965 Federal Excise Tax Reduction Upon the Prices of Automotive
Replacement Parts—A Case Study in Tax Shifting and Pyramiding," National Tax
Journal (Sept., 1967), that seemed to indicate that those auto parts, accessories,
etc., for which the demand was presumably the most elastic showed the greatest
decline in price, relative to the tax reduction. Ibid., p. 256.18 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
The first attempts to ascertain the incidence of the corporation in-
come tax in the United States by appeal to time series were based on
the curious fact that from the 1920's to the mid-1950's post-tax cor-
porate profits in industry and trade changed very little if expressed as a
return on book value of net worth, but declined appreciably as a per-
centage of sales, while the rate of the corporation income tax was in-
creasing from 12.5 per cent to 52 per cent. In two articles written
independently, John Clendenin,5' and. Eugene M. Lerner and Eldon S.
Hendriksen,52 concluded that these data indicated a shifting of the in-
creases in the corporation income tax—probably forward, for the most
part. Plausible nontax developments during that period (e.g., faster
turnover of inventories) were adduced to explain the drop in profit as a
percentage of sales. On the other hand, Edward T. Thompson and
Charles E. Silbermaninterpreted these data to mean that the increases
in that tax had not been shifted. On the whole, the Clendenin-Lerner-
Hendriksen conclusion seems more acceptable than that of Thompson
and But the evidence is rather slender.
A new approach was developed with the appearance of the "empir-
ical study of [the corporation income tax's]...short-runeffect upon
the rate of return," by Marian Krzyzaniak and Richard A. Musgrave.55
The K-M Model "observes effects coming about within a year," 56or
"within a short period, i.e., a few years,"a period during which "fixed
capital adjustments are hardly possible,"or "the effects of changes in
capital stock in the corporate sector enter to a very limited degree only."
The study is limited to manufacturing corporations.60
Structural equations (definitional and behavioral) are given for.
production, aggregate demand, consumption, investment, labor supply,
"Effect ofCorporate IncomeTaxeson Corporate Earnings," Taxes, The
TaxMagazine (June, 1956).
52"FederalTaxes on Corporate Income and the Rate of Return on Invest-
ment in Manufacturing," National Tax Journal (Sept., 1956).
"Can Anything Be Done about Corporate Taxes?" Fortune (May, 1955).
See the critique of these studies by Carl S. Shoup in "Some Problems in
the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax," American Economic Review (May,
1960), pp. 463—67.
The Shifting of the Corporation income Tax. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
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labor demand, prices, rate of return, and the tax function itself; but aside
from the last of these, no functional forms are given. (A few lagged
variables are supplied.) The tax function in its "Model A" form, to
which most attention is given, is Yg —Y'= thatis, the before-tax
rate of return on capital under the tax, minus the rate of return on
capital in absence of the tax, equals a certain proportion: the ratio
of the firm's tax bill to its capital stock.
No behavioral equation is supplied with respect to the business
firm's attitude toward profits.
Throughout, K-M evince awareness of the point made in Section
11-A above; namely, that an increase in the corporation income tax rate
must make something else change: government expenditures increase, or
some other tax is reduced, or government debt is retired, or the govern-
ment's cash balance increases. K-M imply that the first of these is the
most likely, or the most important, and accordingly point out that they
are left with "a result which may come closer to that of budget effects
than that of absolute corporation-tax effects." 61Thisqualification is re-
peated several times: "the tax coefficient [degree of shifting, which in
this case came to 134 per cent, with a 95 per cent confidence limit giv-.
ing an interval from 111 per cent to 157 per cent] 62isexaggerated by a
G [government expenditure] effect which cannot be separated out.
That is to say, our measure is not only one of tax incidence, but is con-
taminated by influences of budget incidence." 63Whenan adjustment for
inflation has lowered the estimated degree of shifting to about 100 per
cent, "this result still tends to overstate the degree of tax shifting be-
cause [government] expenditure effects are present. Thus, it appears that
pure tax shifting will be below 100 per cent." 64Whenprofit is ex-
pressed as a share in value added, and only 40 per cent shifting is
thereupon found, one reason may be that "the government expenditure
effect which is not neutralized in our measure of rate-of-return shifting
tends to be self-neutralizing in the share measure." 05
Finally,the "stark outline of the major policy conclusions which
61Ibid.,pp. 6—7. "...itwould hardly be possible to construct a model
measuring 'differential' effects. The best we can do is to aim at 'absolute' effects,
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follow if the hypothesis of 100 per cent short-run shifting is accepted," a
hypothesis "supported by our result for the all-manufacturing case, cor-
rected for inflation," must evidently be viewed in light of the fact that
"several reasons—especially failure to separate government expenditure
effects—suggest thatthisresultoverstatesthe degree of short-run
shifting." 66
Yetdespite these disclaimers, the title and the tone of the book
suggest that what was discovered was indeed the degree of shifting of
the corporation income tax. Reception of the findings might have been
facilitated if the study had been entitled "The Effect on After-Tax Profits
of Manufacturing Corporations Exerted by Changes in the Corporate
Income Tax Rate and Associated Changes in Government Expenditures
and Probably Other Government Variables," but the publisher might
well have demurred.
R. J. Gordon's critique, interestingly enough, does not touch di-
rectly on this "expenditure contamination" aspect of the K-M findings,
and his comments on the results under his own technique do not men-
tion this point, save in a brief footnote that seems almost an after-
thought.67 Perhaps he decided that there was little need to make this
point, since even without it, he arrives at a finding of zero shifting,
either for a rate-of-return concept of profits or an income-share concept.
In contrast to K-M, Gordon derives his independent variables
from "a model of the probable profit performance of firms that practice
mark-up pricing behavior." 68Thefinding that "the parameter of tax
shifting is not significantly different from zero" 69isreached when using
the K-M time span, but employing a different method of estimation
and—much more important according to Gordon—a different specifica-
tion (different model). When the time period is extended to 1925—41
plus 1946—62, the results are strikingly similar. It might even be argued
GBibid.,p. 66.
"To test the effect of the corporation income tax on profit rates, we must
be able to estimate the level of profit rates in the absence of the tax. Obviously
we must assume that without a corporation income tax government revenues are
maintained by some other kind of tax. Otherwise a diminution of government
revenues would result in a change either in government spending or in the surplus-
deficit position and thus in all the economic magnitudes which determine profits."
Robert J. Gordon, "The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manu-
facturing, 1925—62," American Economic Review (Sept., 1967), p. 735, note 6.
68ibid.,p. 733.
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that what Gordon has found, in the terminology of K-M, is an appre-
ciable but unknown amount of negative shifting of the corporation in-
come tax if his findings are "contaminated" by the government-expen-
diture effect as much as theirs are.
As with Gordon's analysis, that by John 0. Cragg, Arnold C. Har-
berger, and Peter Mieszkowskiattacksthe K-M findings on grounds
other than the "contamination" factor. Adding the employment rate and
a dummy variable to the K-M Model to capture the influence of cyclical
and wartime phenomena, C-H-M obtain regression equations implying
that corporations recouped only about half the increases in corporation
income tax. Assuming that in the unincorporated sector, which com-
petes with the incorporated sector for capital, the profit rate had to fall
by about the same degree (here, by about one half of the tax) by which
the corporate sector failed to recoup increases in the tax on it; and
noting that about as much capital is employed in the one sector as in
the other in total, C-H-M conclude that their variant of the K-M Model
implies that total capital, incorporated and unincorporated, bore at least
about 100 per cent of the increases in the corporation income tax: "at
least" because their estimating procedure is admittedly biased in two
ways that tend to overestimate the proportion of the tax that is shifted.7'
But C-H-M are unwilling to accept even their version of the K-M Model,
in view of the inherent risks in the use of time series for this kind of
study.12'
70"EmpiricalEvidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,"
Journal of Political Economy (Dec., 1967).
11 ibid., p. 820.
72Ibid.,p. 821. See also the C-H-M Rejoinder to the K-M Response on
Corporation Tax Shifting, Journal of Political Economy (July-Aug., 1970), p. 774:
"the pitfalls associated with estimating corporation tax incidence from time-series
data, in K-M fashion, are too numerous and serious for the results to be trust-
worthy."
Space limitations prevent recapitulation here of the kngthy and cogent
critiques of the K-M analysis given by Richard Goode, "Rate of Return, Income
Shares, and Corporate Tax Incidence," and Richard E. Slitor, "Corporate Tax
Incidence: Economic Adjustments to Differentials under a Two-Tier Tax Struc-
ture," in Marian Krzyzaniak, ed., Effects of Corporation income Tax. Detroit,
Wayne State University Press, 1966; the study by R. W. Kilpatrick, "The Short-
Run Forward Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax," Yale Economic Essays
(Fall, 1965); the findings reached by Challis Hall, "Direct Shifting of the Corpora-
tion Income Tax in Manufacturing," American Economic Review (May, 1964),
pp. 258—71; and the application of the K-M Model to another country byKarl W.22 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
Future empirical research at the partial-equilibrium level, covering
changes in excise-tax rates, might well continue along the lines de-
veloped by Due, Brownlee, and others. Readiness is important, enabling
the researcher to seize the occasion when itarises. To this end, the
National Bureau, or some other research body, might stockpile tech-
niques and avenues of information so that a study could be mounted
quickly when a tax reduction or a tax increase appeared imminent. For
example, some information might be gathered on the industry structure,
and pricing policies, of the cigarette industry (including the wholesalers
and retailers of cigarettes) so that we might know in advance something
about what to expect, and where to go to observe the price changes
when a tax on cigarettes is altered.
As to the broad-based taxes, however, a prescription is much more
difficult. A number of major questions have to be answered before
further research is actually started. Is the time-series technique pioneered
in this field by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave as risky as Cragg, Harberger,
and Mieszkowski fear? If it is not, just how are the shifting coefficients
to be interpreted (the contamination problem)? Does the divergence of
findings, e.g., K-M versus Gordon, indicate an inherent complexity that
cannot be mastered, or does it simply mean that we learn by doing? Can
a general-equilibrium model of the kind outlined by Bossons and
Shoupascertain the effects of the substitution of one tax for another?
Is there an implied negative answer to this question in Musgrave's re-
mark that it is hardly possible to construct a model measuring differen-
tial effects?
I have no firm answers to these questions. Perhaps the prescription
is: set enough research teams on the problem with enough different ap-
proaches to enable us to learn much more about what we face. The one
certain thing seems to be that we are many years, perhaps several dec-
ades, away from firm knowledge in this field, and that aside from time
and money, which are always helpful, we shall need large amounts of
daring laced with modesty.
Roskamp, "The Shifting of Taxes on Business Income: The Case of the West
German Corporations," National Tax Journal (Sept., 1965), pp. 247—57.
John Bossons and Carl S. Shoup, "Analyzing the Effects of Large-Scale
Changes in Fiscal Structure: A Proposed Systems Approach," in National Bureau
of Economic Research, New Challenges for Economic Research, Forty-Ninth
Annual Report (Oct., 1969), pp. 11—26.
"Seenote 61 above.Public Expenditures and Taxation 23
C. Effects of Taxes on Investment and Other Business Behavior
(1) Effects on Investment. Until fairly recently, there was little
in the way of empirical studies of the effects of tax measures on invest-
ment—in the national-income sense of investment. The Coiwyn Com-
mittee's efforts to discern the incidence of the income tax on profits
(referred to in note 6 above) carried implications for this issue. Studies
of how tax changes affected portfolio investment also supplied indirect
evidence on bricks-and-mortar investment, notably Lawrence H. Selt-
zer's monumental work, under National Bureau auspices, on capital
gains and losses under the United States federal income-tax.76 In suc-
ceeding years, the National Bureau led the way in gathering and analyz-
ing data on the impact of the federal income-tax system on dividends
and profits in general, while abstaining from conjecture as to the effects
of these tax rates on investment decisions. Holland contributed two
monographs on the federal income-tax burden on stockholders," con-
taining further facts relevant to the investment issue but not directly
attacking the problem of ascertaining what the consequences might be.
Lent's study of the ownership of tax-exempt securities for the period
1919—1953 78filledin another background segment by discovering that
the concentration of ownership of such securities among the high-income
individuals was somewhat less than might have been expected on
pecuniary grounds. Kahn's detailed analysis of income and income-tax
liabilities of unincorporated concerns, including the professions, covered
a part of the business field that had been rather neglected.7°
In the past few years, research has been more directly oriented to
the question, Is business investment affected by the kinds of tax change
the western world has experienced over the past several decades? and,
if so, in what directions and in what approximate magnitudes? Three ap-
proaches have been utilized.
70TheNature and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses (with the
assistance of Selma F. Goldsmith and M. Slade Kendrick). New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1951.
Daniel M. Holland, The Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders, Princeton
University Press, 1958; and Dividends under the Income Tax, Princeton University
Press, 1962.
78GeorgeE. Lent, The Ownership of Tax-Exempt Securities, 1913—1953,
Occasional Paper 47. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955.
C.Harry Kahn, Business and Professional income under the Personal In-
come Tax. A Study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton
University Press, 1964.24 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
One is to ascertain the extent to which business firms do take ad-
vantage of accelerated depreciation allowances and similar tax induce-
ments to invest. If, because of ignorance or overriding nontax considera-
tions, firms make little use of these incentives, the analysis can stop
there until more is learned about the theory of the firm. Ture's findings,
covering both corporations and unincorporated enterprises in the United
States with respect to the accelerated depreciation introduced in 1954,
show that we cannot stop there, since the data for the first six or seven
years of experience with these new provisions indicate that "a large
proportion of the depreciable facilities acquired by corporations since
1953 and still on hand in 1959 was in accelerated method accounts." 80
Ture goes on to a conjecture—based on a range of assumed elasticities
of the demand, and supply functions for these facilities,81—that outlays
were from $1.3 billion to $5.7 billion more in 1959 than they would
have been in the absence of the 1954 innovation.82 This finding rests,
of course, on far less secure ground than do those simply describing the
extent to which accelerated depreciation was, in fact, used.
For me, at least, the importance of the distinction between a firm's
willingness to accept the chance to reduce taxes by using accelerated
depreciation and the degree to which it allows such tax-saving to in-
fluence its investment decisions was enhanced by the appalling findings
of Stanback,83 obtained in interviews with executives of twenty-five tex-
tile firms concerning practice, in that industry, in face of inducements to
investment created by the more generous depreciation provisions and
the introduction of the investment-tax credit in 1962. I use the word
appalling, because only 36 per cent of the firms interviewed used invest-
ment computation formulas that made explicit any part of the tax-sav-
ings of liberalized depreciation. More than half of this group, to be
sure, was composed of large firms. Nonetheless, it must have a sobering
effect on the tax theorist to be informed that not only did the other 64
per cent of the firms use rules for investment that took no account of
this tax saving, but also that "there was little evidence that, at time of
interview, these firms were recognizing [even]informally...that
SO Norman B. Ture, Accelerated Depreciation in the United States, 1954—60.
National Bureau of Economic Research. New York, Columbia University Press,
1967, p. 97.
81 Ibid., p. 95.
82 ibid., p. 97.
83 Thomas M. Stanback, Jr., Tax Changes and Modernization in the Textile
Industry. National Bureau of Economic Research. New York, Columbia University
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liberalized depreciation resulted in reduction in the after-tax pay-back
period, or in an increase in the effective rate of return." 84,85
Asecond approach is the comparative one, in which public finance
analysts accept assignments to appraise the effects of recent tax policies
on investment in their respective countries, then meet to refine their
conclusions, or conjectures, by conference discussion. The NBER and
The Brookings Institution held such a conference in 1963Thedescrip-
tions of the various tax techniques used to stimulate growth expanded
the range of the observers' propensity for a priori model-building. Many
misconceptions as to what had been attempted elsewhere were removed.
The conference paid substantial intellectual dividends. But, as E. Gor-
don Keith remarked in his Introduction and Summary, it became evi-
dent that "much too little is known about the actual effects of specific
tax measures on the savings and investment decisions of individuals and
corporations." None of the conferees who formed opinions on the tax
effects were "able to offer much empirical support for their positions."
A third approach is econometric, employing either time series or
cross-sectional data, observing how the rate of investment differs, and
attempting to isolate the degree to which these differences are due to tax
changes. This approach is well illustrated in the volume shortly to be
published by The Brookings Institution, Tax Incentives and Capital
Spending,88 containing four papers designed "to develop models of fixed
84Ibid.,p.103. Professor Stanback himself does not employ language as
forceful as mine in. appraising the investment attitudes he discovered, but the
closing paragraphs on his p. 105 should be required reading for all tax economists.
I am indebted to David Stout for the following observation: "Similarly disturbing
findings emerged from the questioning of Directors of fourteen U.K. corporations
as reported by the Richardson Committee on Turnover Taxation in 1964. How-
ever, by 1969, on a much wider survey of industrial responses to changes in the
effective rate of corporate taxation there was a good deal more evidence of tax-
consciousness in pricing and investment decisions. See National Economic De-
velopment Office, ValueAddedTax, Chapter 6. A comprehensive postal question-
naire and case-study interview inquiry into the effects of accelerated depreciation
and cash grants for investment by the U.K. Ministry of Technology is nearing
completion."
85ChallisHall's interview survey of the effects of changes in the corporate
income tax on investment decisions over a wide spectrum of industry was halted
by his untimely death.
86NationalBureau of Economic Research and The Brookings Institution,
ForeignTax Policiesand Economic Growth. New York, Columbia University
Press, 1966.
81Ibid.,p. 37.
88Mycomments on, and quotations from, this volume are based on a copy of
the page proof kindly supplied by The Brookings Institution in August, 1970.26 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
investment behavior of United States business firms and to evaluate the
impact on capital spending of federal tax incentives enacted since the
etid of the Second World War." 89Thesepapers were the subject of a
conference at which Discussion Papers were presented by Franklin M.
Fisher and Arnold C. Harberger.°°
This is a very illuminating volume if only because it makes so
evident the enormous difficulty of isolating the quantitative effects of a
tax measure. Although the four papers "were prepared by competent
scholars" Fisher remarks, the four analyses "are all marked
by high quality," each one applying "sophisticated econometric tools
in a professional and convincing manner" °2—and although each
paper "had the objective of measuring the same phenomena," yet, in the
event, "each obtained a significantly different answer."
While Fromm remarks that "this is no cause for despair,"and
expresses the hope that "improvements in theory and refinements in the
data will lead to more definitive conclusions," 05Harbergerseems less
optimistic: "The basic trouble is that, in much of their work, economists
are destined to deal with a limited body of data." 00Fisher,perhaps, falls
in between: "I cannot pretend to resolve these contradictions here. But
I can hope to promote their resolution"by a systematic analysis of the
four treatments. In contrast to Fromm and Harberger, Fisher is willing
to state a preference: "I am slightly more disposed to accept the results
of [Charles W.J Bischoff 98andof [Lawrence R.] Klein and [Paul] Taub-
man 90thanthose of [Robert M.] Coen 100andof [Robert E.] Hall and
[Dale W.] Jorgenson." 101,102
Wemust recall that, even if these papers had reached agreement,
80GaryFromm, ed., op. cit., Ch. I, Introduction, p. 1.
00ibid.,Chs. VI and VII, respectively.
91Fromm,op. cit., p.1.
02Ibid.,p. 243.
93Fromm,op. cit., p.1. The differences in the answers are themselves too





98"TheEffect of Alternative Lag Distributions," op. cit., Ch. III.
90"EstimatingEffects within a Complete Econometric Model," op. cit., Ch. V.
100"TheEffect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment," op. cit., Ch. IV.
101Applicationof the Theory of Optimum Capital Accumulation," op. cit.,
Ch. H.
102Fromm,op. cit., p. 255.Public Expenditures and Taxation 27
they would have told us nothing about the effect of the tax changes on
investment in total. This was not their task. They were concerned only
with the effects of federal income tax changes that introduced acceler-
ated depreciation in 1954; new shorter lifetimes for depreciating invest-
ment, and the investment credit, in 1962; the decrease in tax rates, par-
ticularly the corporate profits tax rate, in 1964; and suspension of the
investment credit for a part of 1966—67. None of these tax measures
applied to all private investment, and the investment credit was re-
stricted to equipment of more than a certain expected life.
Harberger remarks that "most proponents of this [tax relief] legisla-
tion" probably thought that it "would increase investment in the U.S.
economy in relation to some measure... suchas gross national prod-
uct.. •" 103Yet, in fact, investment as a percentage of GNP was
slightly less from 1962 through the first half of 1967 than from 1955
through 1961. "The answer lies largely in the truism that investment
must equal savings for the economy as a whole," while "the tax measures
under consideration. ..providedno clear incentive to savings." 104
Rather, these measures were, in part, the cause of a change in the
composition of investment, away from residential construction to other
private domestic nonresidential investment, principally plant and equip-
ment spending.105
Two other points that Harberger makes are particularly telling,
especially since they lie quite apart from most of the technical disagree-
ments over methods of approach that occupy the authors of the four
papers.
First, it seems odd that three of the papers should be, apparently,
so vulnerable to the charge of having ignored the simple but basic point
that if the corporation income tax rate alone is raised, there will be
some diversion of capital into the unincorporated sector, with a con-
sequent tendency for the pretax rate of return on capital to rise in the
former sector, and to fall in the latter.106
Harberger's second point is more serious:
"Hall and Jorgenson, Bischoff and Coen simply bypass all general
equilibrium considerations and concentrate on attempting to mea-




106 This criticism applies to the papers by Hall-Jorgenson, Bischoff, and Coen.
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purport to say anything about the total effect. The total effect must
be less than the direct effect where alternative monetary policy
would have kept the time path of income the same; it must be
greater than the direct effect where alternative monetary policy
would have kept the time path of interest rates the same; and it can
be either greater or less than the direct effect in the case where the
alternative policy would have maintained the same time path of the
money supply—all this in the context of the simple models outlined
[by Harberger] above, and referring only to covered [i.e., directly
affected by the tax measure] investment." 107
Whenone considers that, along with the points made in the pre-
ceding five paragraphs, there are the formidable technical issues of
choice of econometric techniques (discussed at some length in all of the
papers, and in the two Discussions), optimism does not come easily. But
we must remind ourselves that the difficulty is great only because the
aim is so high: no less than to extract quantitative answers, on which all
will agree (or almost agree), as to the effects on certain types of invest-
ment decisions of tax changes made over a period of time in which so
many other forces were operating on these same decisions. Perhaps we
shall be, for some time yet, limited to the general kind of conclusions
reached by Harberger, largely on a priori reasoning, with fairly simple
models:
"In sum, therefore, the quality of the work presented here is very
high, but the analyses leave unfinished and unclear the picture of
the quantitative effects of the tax incentives that have been ex-
amined. I remain prone to the same rough judgment about these
incentives that I have held for several years: that they played an
important role in permitting us to come reasonably close to full
employment in the presence of a strong balance-of-payments con-
straint; that they accomplished this by creating a situation in which
the interest rate level consistent with full employment was sig-
nificantly higher than it otherwise would be; that, viewed against
alternative ways of achieving full employment, these tax stimuli
produced a massive shift of investment from the noncovered sector
(principally residential housing)to the covered sector, without
much change in total investment; and that, viewed against the al-
ternative of maintaining the same interest-rate or balance-of-pay-
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ments posture that obtained, the incentives probably account for a
significant increase in total investment and in income." 108
Asthe reader of the present monograph has probably gathered by
now, I am particularly attracted by Harberger's insistence on specifying
the alternative with which the existing situation is to be compared if some
sort of general-equilibrium answer is to be implied in the findings.
(2) Effects on Other Business Behavior.Effects of taxation on
business behavior other than investment spending—and other than
changes in prices and factor payments covered under the discussion of
incidence—are so numerous as to defy any attempt at listing them. This
need not be tried here, anyway, since few of these effects have been the
subject of quantitative study. The present section is limited to some brief
remarks on the effects on financial structure and on methods of wage, or
salary, payment.
(a) Financial Structure. When the corporate income tax in the
United States reached 52 per cent in the years following World War II,
and many states imposed their own taxes on corporate profits, there was
a good deal of inconclusive discussion among tax economists, in and out
of the Treasury, about the possible consequences for the pattern of cor-
porate financing. Since interest paid was deductible, and dividends paid
were not, corporations were afforded a golden opportunity to enhance
per share earnings by issuing long-term debt, at interest rates that were
still not high historically, and with the proceeds buying up their own
shares on the market, or through tender offers, until the price of the
shares rose to a point where no further increment in per share earnings
could be obtained. This limit could not, of course, be expected to be
approached closely, in view of the many nontax considerations affecting
the decision with respect to the debt/equity ratio. Still, it was somewhat
surprising that not a single large corporation embarked on a plan of this
kind [if I recall correctly].'°°
Many years passed before a speculative boom stimulated outsiders
to seize the opportunity, in connection with the conglomerate craze of
the late 1960's. By issuing debt in large amounts, the new corporation—
1°8ibid., pp.268—69.
109Behaviorof the large corporations is what counts, in terms of aggregate
effect on the economy. Stalistics of income for 1966, Corporation Income Tax
Returns (page 63), shows that of the $77.1 billion corporate net income subject
to tax, 91 corporations accounted for 29 per cent. Slightly less than half of the
corporate net-income subject to tax was accounted for by the 480 largest corpora-
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or the acquiring corporation—was able to realize so much in savings on
the corporation income tax that it could offer what then appeared to be
very attractive terms of exchange. Action provoked reaction, and the
tax law was amended to limit, to some degree, this kind of debt issue,
but there still remains an opportunity for tax saving on the part of many
large corporations not involved in the conglomerate deals. I believe that
this remark remains valid, even in face of the liquidity squeeze of 1970.
To be sure, the volume of corporate borrowing, relative to equity
financing, did rise enough over the past two decades (excluding the
conglomerates) to suggest that the tax factor was at work, especially if
one accepts, 'even if only in part, the Modigliani-Miller thesis that in the
absence of the tax, or other similar disturbing factor, investors' own
portfolio adjustments should—in principle—so take account of any
change in the corporations' financial structures as to leave unchanged
the net worth of the firm. Yet the response of many large United States
corporations to this tax differential between debt and equity financing
was sluggish enough to indicate great relative importance for nontax
factors.
One of these nontax factors is, of course, risk. A recent study by
Luigi Tambini 110takesinto account estimated changes in riskiness of
debt (lender's risk) and riskiness of equity (borrower's risk) and ex-
plains away, for certain years, much of the apparent puzzle that arises
when average costs of equity-financing or of debt-financing, rather than
marginal costs, are considered. The "change in lender's and borrower's
risk will be estimated and then added to average costs to give estimates
of the corresponding marginal costs for seven bench-mark years."
Tambini concludes that in five of these years (1927, 1932, 1937, 1960,
and 1965), manfacturing corporations "were close or very close to
financial equilibrium," so that only in the other two years (1949 and
1953) does some of the puzzle remain for this group of corporations;
in these two years, "the marginal cost of equity financing substantially
exceeded the marginal cost of debt financing." 11.2
110 "FinancialPolicy and the Corporate Income Tax," in. Arnold C. Harberger
and Martin J. Bailey, eds., The Taxation of Income from Capital. Washington,
D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1969, pp. 185—222. See Franco Modigliani and
Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment," American Economic Review, Vol. 48 (June, 1958), Pp. 261—97.
111Harbergerand Bailey, op. cit., p. 194. Tambini used the regression res%llts
obtained by Lawrence Fisher (debt) and Marshall Kolin (equity) as to changes
in risk. State corporation income taxes are apparently not taken into account.
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In Tambini's analysis,' "The basic point is that a change in financial
structure affects the riskiness of corporate capital, that is, of debt and
equity...anincrease in debt financing, or leverage, increases the
riskiness of the firm..., andtherefore the risk for debt-holders
(lender's risk) and the risk for stockholders (borrower's risk) •"113
Clearly,Tambini's analysis can, as he points out, be accepted only by
those who are willing to follow him in differing fundamentally with
Modigliani and Miller. They "postulate a net separation between vari-
ability and uncertainty of earnings," the latter referring to nonfinancial
or business risk, and then consider that "'variabilityover time of the
successive elements of the stream [of earnings]...canbe safely
neglected. •"114 AsTambini notes, "If earnings variability can be
neglected, so can 'financial risk' and therefore financial structure." 115
Butin Tambini's view, "Variability of earnings would be perfectly irrel-
evant only if the time distribution of earnings were known with cer-
tainty." 116
Onceagain the public-finance economist is forced to suspend judg-
ment unless he is fairly sure which of the underlying, and still con-
tested, theoretical structures he will accept (if indeed either).
There remains, of course, the largely unexplored area of the finan-
cial structure of unincorporated concerns. Here, the traditional reliance
on debt-financing in some subareas, notably the housing market, might
be expected to mask the effects, if any, of the tax differential in a man-
ner just the opposite of what occurs in the corporate field. If the tax law
had exempted earnings of unincorporated concerns as long as they were
retained in the business, would the pattern of financing in the noncor-
porate sector have been appreciably different? 117
Theother major taxes in the United States seem not, by a priori
reasoning, to affect appreciably the capital structure of business firms.
Exceptions may be the taxes that are not linked directly with cash flows
—notably the real estate tax imposed on capital value; these taxes must
induce some caution in assuming still further fixed cash-outlay commit-
ments. Do business firms with a slow rate of capital turnover—thus, by
113Ibid.,p. 196.
114Ibid.,p. 196, note 17.
115Idem
116 Ibid., p. 197.
117Someof the findings of Seltzer are relevant to this issue; see his Interest As
a Source of Personal income and Tax Revenue. Occasional Paper No. Si. New
York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1955.32 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
implication, depending more on assets of a kind subject to the real
estate tax—finance themselves less with debt than do those with a rapid
rate of capital turnover? In practice, it seems to be the other way around,
since the very assets that attract real estate tax also serve nicely as
collateral for bonds. But this statement leaves the basic question still
open: How would the financing pattern change if the real estate tax
were levied as a percentage of rent actually received? So far as I am
aware, no quantitative studies have been made of the effect of the real
estate tax (capital-value type) on business financial structure.
(b) Methods of Wage or Salary Payment. Common observa-
tion suggests that in the United States the payment of wages and salaries
in the form of cash has been reduced appreciably by the tax-exempt or
tax-deferred status of offset income; that is, income that takes the form
of a claim that a taxpayer obtains from a market transaction but which
is offset, in whole or in large part, by a simultaneous obligation he in-
curs, or free service that he is given. (The taxpayer is operating on both
sides of the market at once.) An example is supplied by good working
conditions. No doubt cash wages and salaries have also been increased
by the existence of poor working conditions. But the net result of the
income tax itself is to put pressure on firms to improve working con-
ditions, rather than to give an increase in cash wages or salary that
would be equally satisfactory to the employee, after allowing for the tax
he has to pay on it. Some evidence is at hand on the extent to which
substitutes for direct cash payment have been employed, with particular
reference to the income tax."8
Allied to payment in offset income is payment in deferred income,
or in potentially tax-favored income, as through stock options.119
The 1969 Tax Reform Act, by setting a bracket-rate ceiling of 50
per cent on earned income, may provide occasion for a study of the
effect of such tax-rate reduction on the amount of salaries and wages
paid in offset income.
118C.Harry Kahn, Employee Compensation Under the Income Tax. National
Bureau of Economic Research. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, and
Wilbur G. Lewellen, Executive Compensation in Large industrial Corporations.
National Bureau of Economic Research. New York, Columbia University Press,
1968; Hugh Holleman Macaulay, Jr., Fringe Benefits and Their Federal Tax
Treatment. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959. See also Robert G. Rice,
"An Analysis of Wage Supplements," Columbia Doctoral Dissertation,1965.
119See,e.g., George E. Lent and John A. Menge, "The Importance of Re-
stricted Stock Options in Executive Compensation," Management Record, Vol. 24,
No. 6 (June, 1962), pp. 6—13.Public Expenditures and Taxation 33
D. Effects of Taxes on Supply of Labor
The effect on supply of labor that is exerted by one or another tax
has usually been taken as a problem in microanalysis. The wage, or
salary, rate before subtraction of tax has been assumed, or implied, to
be the same as it would have been if the tax had not been in existence.
The analysis then seeks to determine the worker's, or executive's, or pro-
fessional's reaction to the reduction in disposable income presumably
represented by the tax.
If the sector of the labor market that is being studied is small
enough, this assumption, or implication, may be useful for that small
sector; but to generalize from it does not seem legitimate. If the response
to the question is generally that everyone would work harder in the
absence of the tax, this increase in the amount of labor offered on the
market might be expected to reduce the marginal productivity of labor
and, hence, the real wage rate; and vice versa, of course, if the responses
were the opposite. More generally, a tax on labor is to be analyzed in a
nonclosed model (i.e., no specification is made of the use of the tax
revenue) as is an excise tax, with effects on the amount of labor, the
wage paid gross of tax, and the wage received net of tax. Friction aside,
it would make no difference whether the tax were levied on the pur-
chaser or the supplier of labor.
Moreover, if the sector being studied is indeed small and spe-
cialized, so that the individuals are analogous to oligopolist firms, an in-
crease in a personal income tax may induce the taxpayers to react almost
as a group in exploiting a hitherto unused portion of their oligopoly
power.
A few examples of recent studies of the effect of taxation on effort
will illustrate these points. George Break's personal interviews with 306
solicitors and accountants in England were evidently carried on under
an assumption that if the income tax were removed, or lowered, their
fees would not be lowered by the increased amount of that kind of labor
that would be put on the market (or would not be raised, if the effect
were the opposite) •120 The same is true of Davidson's conclusions from
interviews with a few high-earning surgeons,'2' and also of the sample
120 G. F. Break, "Income Taxes and Incentives to Work: an Empirical Study,"
American Economic Review (Sept., 1957),pp. 529—49. Breakfound that there
was no rise in the incidence of tax disincentives in this presumably tax-sensitive
group, from that found in the study of workers (see second note below). Loc. cit.,
p. 548.
121Robert Davidson, "Income Taxes and Incentive: the Doctor's Viewpoint,"
National Tax Journal (Sept., 1953), pp. 293—97.34 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
survey carried out in the early 1950's on behalf of the Royal Commis-
sion on the Taxation of Profits and Income, in which a large majority of
the 1,429 workers interviewed said they thought the income tax's dis-
incentive influence tended to reduce output.122
The questions asked recently of the United States business execu-
tives encounter the same problem. If, for example, executives assure us
that under lower taxes they would work more, which presumably implies
more striving in the younger years and less premature retirement, they
are saying that the substitution effect of the tax outweighs the income
effect. If we were then to point out that their lifetime pay ex tax would
fall as more of their labor was put on the market, they would, in
principle, have to compare a new set of income and substitution effects,
each of them now stronger than before this macro element was taken
into account. Even then, as noted above, the question will not have been
put in general-equilibrium terms—or rather, in terms of a closed model
—since it will not have been specified how the government would make
good the loss of revenue.
These cautionary remarks do not imply that such micro-based
studies are valueless, quite the contrary. They are the necessary, and
often laborious and difficult, first steps in attacking the problem of the
effect of taxation on labor effort. The many insights that are gathered
with respect to the individual's reaction to taxation are exemplified in the
recent research project carried on by Daniel M. Holland,123 through his
one- to two-hour interviews with 122 top business executivesin the
United States (together with some less formal individual and group dis-
cussions). Holland emphasized the income effects of the income tax by
asking his interviewees to consider how differently they would have acted
under a tax with the same income effect but without any substitution
122 Second Report. London, HMSO, 1954,p. 108; noted by Break, op. cit.,
p. 529.
123 Daniel M. Holland, "The Effect of Taxation on Effort: Some Results for
Business Executives." Preliminary draft of a paper presented at the National Tax
Conference of 1969, to be published in that conference's Proceedings. (Page
references are to the mimeographed document.) Effort spent on investment decisions
and the effects of death-gift taxes were included in some of the discussions. ibid.,
pp.15—17. This project was supported by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
124 Thirty-three of them were chief executives of large companies, 21 were
chief executives of smaller companies, 46 were middle managers, 17 represented
a cross-section of businessmen in two rapidly growing cities, and 5 were men of
technical or scientific background with academic interests. Ibid., pp. 3—5.Public Expenditures and Taxation 35
effect (a tax on potential income, not an ordinary poll tax) •125 But, as
had the others in preceding studies, he abstracted from any effect on pre-
tax salary that might be exerted from a change in the supply of effort,
either through macroeffects on the labor market, or through exploitation
of unused oligopoly power.
Holland's study cannot be adequately summarized here; but the
chief finding, from the viewpoint of the present section, was that
"the weight of the evidence is consistent with the conclusions based on
other evidence from my own interviews and from earlier studies—most
executives, indeed by far the largest proportion, are working about as
hard as they can despite prevailing levels of income taxation [com-
pared with what would happen under a tax on potential income]." 126
And "not one of the 18 top executives in very large companies felt that
he would be induced to work any harder at his job by so basic a change
in the tax law [i.e., to a tax on potential income]." 127 But some excep-
tions were found among chief executives of smaller companies, and
among managers.
W. B. Reddaway's recently issued Volume One of his study of the
effects of the British Selective Employment Tax (SET) 128 explicitly
recognizes the need to specify what else would have happened had the
tax not been introduced. He will specify an alternative tax,'2° but in this
initial report he defers consideration of that aspect.
Marvin Kosters 130 has extended the macro approach (i.e., specify-




128W. B. Reddaway, Effectsof theSelective Employment Tax, First Report:
The Distribution Trades.London,HMSO, 1970.
120 "In 1966, SET was introduced as a net addition to taxation rather than
in replacement of some other form of tax. Nevertheless, we conceive our task as
being to assess what the effects of SET are, as against having some alternative tax
in its place, or an increase in the level of some other tax. The nature and size of
this alternative taxation needs very careful exposition, which will not be attempted
until we produce our Final Report covering the whole research." This alternative
tax would be presumed to have the same "consequences for the over-all balance
of demand and potential supply for goods and services taken as a whole ...[but]
no special effect on the trades which are unable to recover SET, or on the con-
sumers of their products...." Ageneral tax on value-added is mentioned as a
possible alternative. ibid., p. 3.
"Effects of an Income Tax on Labor Supply," in Harberger and Bailey,
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(i.e., assuming no change in the pretax wage rate), by stipulating, in one
part of his study, that an increase in income tax is used to supply the work-
ers with free government services of equal value. From empirical evi-
dence on wage-rate effects, he concludes that the resulting "change in
labor supply. .inducedby the [income-] compensated wage rate
effect" is "likely to be very small" for male primary workers, while for
married women "an increase in the tax rate which results in a given per-
centage decrease in the net wage rate might be accompanied by as much
as an equal percentage decline in the labor force participation rate."
Kosters also notes that "a change in the income tax rate is likely to have
a smaller effect on labor supplied by a family than is suggested by esti-
mates derived from wage rate changes," since "a single tax rate applied
to a family when a joint return is filed...providesno incentive for
substitution between family members. • •" 131
E. Excess Burden from Taxation
Although the literature on excess burden in public finance is vast,
quantitative estimates seem not to have been attempted before Arnold
C. Harberger's 1955 contribution on the welfare loss caused by excessive
depletion and similar allowances.'32 His subsequent contributions, to be
noted below, appear to have been the only ones of their kind published
until the 1969 volume of which he was coeditor.133 This lack of par-
ticipation by the profession is difficult to account for, except that worry
over the quantitative aspects of excess burden isdifficult to arouse
among lawmakers, or, for that matter, anyone but economists.
Excess burden, as that term is used here, refers to the reduction in
welfare that occurs under the pressure exerted on individuals and busi-
ness firms by a tax, a subsidy, or a free government service: the pressure
being to substitute one pattern of action for another, otherwise more
131 Ibid., p. 323. As an alternative to the government services, Kosters, of
course, offers an equal-yield tax which has no effect on the labor supply.
132 "The Taxation of Mineral Industries in the United States," in U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Federal Tax Policy for Economic
Growth. Washington, D.C., Superintendent of Documents, 1955, pp. 439—49. See
also Susan R. Agria, "Special Tax Treatment of Mineral Industries," in Harberger
and Bailey, eds., op.cit.,pp. 77—122, where itis estimated that "thereis an
incentive to invest about 1.5 times as much capital to produce a given income
stream in oil exploration and development as in another industry not accorded the
depletion and expensing privileges..." (p.96). "For coal, there is incentive to
invest around 1.8 times as much capital as in a normal industry" (p. 98).
'33See note 110 above.Public Expenditures and Taxation 37
acceptable to the actor, simply to change thereby the amount of tax;
and so on. (In the end, the actor—or, at least, the actors in the aggregate
—do not gain even that satisfaction, since the tax rates, for example, are
raised to obviate the loss in revenue.) The action affected may be the
choice of a pattern of consumption (including leisure as an element in
consumption), or the choice of a technique of production. The results of
acting in such fashion are compared with the hypothetical results under
some neutral tax of equivalent revenue. Here, neutral means that the
amount of the neutral tax due does not change if the taxpayer alters his
choice among the patterns of consumption or production. This is true,
for example, of a head tax, which is indeed neutral with respect to all
types of action, save emigration or suicide. A uniform-rate tax on the
return from all capital is, while a corporation income tax is not, neutral
with respect to (a) the pattern in which total production is carried on as
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors, and (b) methods of
finance.
Harberger's estimates 134obviouslyhad to employ assumptions
about elasticities of demand and substitutability in production, but the
ones he selected seem plausible enough to make the estimates worth tak-
ing seriously (unit elasticities of demand, Cobb-Douglas production
functions). The amounts of excess burden involved, though perhaps not
large enough to weigh heavily with unconcerned policy-makers, cer-
tainly deserve attention. For the corporate income tax, Harberger esti-
mated an excess burden of about $1.5 billion a year as of 1953—55; this
figure would presumably be much larger as of For the indi-
vidual income tax, he estimated some $1 billion a year of excess burden
134"TheCorporation Income Tax: An Empirical Appraisal," in U.S. Congress,
Committee on Ways and Means, Tax Revision Compendium. Washington, D.C.,
Superintendent of Documents, 1959, Vol. 1, pp. 231—50; and "Taxation, Resource
Allocation, and Welfare," in National Bureau of Economic Research and Brook-
ings Institution Conference Report, The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxation in
the Federal Revenue System. Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 25—70, and
Comment by E. Cary Brown and William Feilner.
Op.cit., 1959, p. 235. Leonard Gerson Rosenberg, "Taxation of Income
from Capital, by Industry Group," in Harberger and Bailey, eds., op. cit., estimates
the net cost of distortion from the corporation income tax and the property tax,
1959 ($20 billion corporate profits tax, $14 billion property taxes), at some $600
million. Rosenberg notes that "it is plausible to assume that the property tax does
tend to offset the distorting effect of the corporate profits tax on the corporate
sector." Ibid., p. 179. He does not compute the distortion cost for the corporate
profits tax separately, but does distribute the distortion cost of both taxes together,
industry by industry.38 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
from the inducement to work less, than under an equal-yield tax that
did not lower the cost of To this, he added another $1 billion
to account for the pressure exerted by the income tax toward present
consumption at the cost of larger future consumption, compared with a
tax that did not thus change the terms of trade between present and
future.'37 Finally, we must add the estimates for excess burden created
by tax preferences for one or another industry. Harberger estimated that
percentage depletion and its related provisions cost between $0.5 and
$1.0 billion a year in welfare,'38 and cited a study by Laidler giving
about the same range of welfare loss from the income tax exemption of
net imputed rent on owner-occupied housing.139
Taking all of these estimates together, and intuitively updating them
to 1970, suggests that the excess burden of the federal revenue system
(to say nothing of the state and local tax systems) might well be of the
order of some $10 billion a year. Two obvious next steps in quantitative
work are: (1) to extend the estimates to state and local taxes; and (2)
to ascertain how much of this total welfare loss could be recouped by
altering the United States tax system in a manner not obviously unac-
ceptable for other reasons.
A third step, although equally obvious, poses more formidable
problems of computation. It arises from the need to take account of the
theory of second-best. From James Meade, we learn that in a world
where the excess burden in question is not the only instance of diver-
gence between marginal values and true costs, "the reduction of one of
these divergences—the others remaining unchanged—will not neces-
sarily lead to an increase in economic welfare, but may very well reduce
it." Paraphrasing one of Meade's illustrations, we may postulate that if,
for example, in two industries turning out highly substitutable products
(say, rail transport service and highway transport service) such diver-
gences exist—owing to special taxes on each of the two industries (the
proceeds not being devoted to supply infrastructure for them)—the
divergence being considerably higher in the one (say, rail transport)
Op. cit., 1964, p. 51.
'"Op. cit., 1964, p. 61.
138 op. cit.,1955,pp.439—49.
'39 This study was published, in 1969, in Harberger and Bailey, eds., op. cit.,
David Laidler, "Income Tax Incentives for Owner-Occupied Housing," pp. 50—76.
Laidler'sminimum estimate of the welfare cost "of the failure to levy the income
tax on the service accruing to owner-occupiers" is somewhat more than $500
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than in the other, a reduction of the divergence in the latter (highway
transport) by a reduction in the special tax on such transport might de-
crease total welfare.'4°
A more general statement of the theory of second-best was later
developed by R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster: "...giventhat one
of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum
situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian
conditions." 141 Lipsey and Lancaster concede that Meade's approach,
which "deals with a system containing many constraints and investigates
the optimum (second-best) level for one of them, assuming the invaria-
bility of all the others," is "probably the appropriate one when consider-
ing problems of actual policy in a world where many imperfections exist
and only a few can be removed at any one time," in contrast to their
approach, which is to "assume the existence of [only] one [such] con-
straint...andthen to investigate the nature of the conditions that
must be satisfied in order to achieve a second-best optimum. • ••"
Theproblem thus appears to be whether a particular quantitative
estimate of the amount to be gained in welfare by eliminating one spe-
cific divergence is seriously, or only negligibly, affected by the existence
of the large number of other important divergences in the economic sys-
tem. Harberger, while calling attention to the problem of second-best,
has not attempted to allow for it in the quantitative estimates noted
above.143
F. Time Series and Cross-Section Studies of Tax System
Characteristics
Since the development of a tax system over time in any one country
has commonly been studied to help answer one or more of the questions
presented here under other headings, and since the same may be said of
comparative studies across countries, there is only a limited value in the
140 J. E. Meade, Tradeand Welfare.London, Oxford University Press, 1955,
p.102.
141 "The General Theory of Second-Best," Review of Economic Studies, Vol.
XXIV(J), No. 63 (1956—57), p. 11.
142 Ibid., p. 13.
143 "The Measurement of Waste," American Economic Review, Vol. LIV, No.
3 (May, 1964), p. 59. See, in this connection, the remarks by Dale E. Jorgenson,
Tjalling C. Koopmans, and Paul A. Samuelson, in "Discussion," ibid., pp. 87—88,
p. 93, and pp. 93—95, respectively; and Karl Roskamp's review of Harberger and
Bailey, op. cit., Journal of Finance (June, 1970), pp. 737—38.40 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
present section as a separate unit of discussion. This is particularly so if,
as I have done, the much-debated issue of a possible maximum ratio of
taxation to national income, or GNP, is postponed to the section dealing
directly with the search for "laws" of government expenditure (III-G
below).
There remain, chiefly, the studies of differences in structures of tax
systems, either in one country over time, or among countries. For ex-
ample, how do the tax systems—each system taken as a whole—com-
pare over time, or among countries, with respect to the proportion taken
in indirect taxes (I should prefer the term impersonal taxes, i.e., taxes
the rates of which depend little, if at all, on the personal attributes of
anyone)? Or how do they differ with respect to the distribution of tax-
ing power among levels of government; with respect to the treatment of
the poor, the e'1derly, the large family, the farmer; or with respect to
domestic capital abroad, and foreign capital at home? 144
Furthermore,even when such questions have been answered, what
do they tell us? Too often the information is hardly more useful, directly,
than data on the proportion of taxation imposed on inhabitants over six
feet in height. Frequently, the reader seems to be expected to supply his
own reasons for wanting to know what proportion of the tax revenue
arises from "indirect" taxes, or for wanting to know whether this
proportion varies, for example, with income per capita.
The most important exceptions to the foregoing charge are the
recent works by Musgrave 145andby Pryor,'4° and the Proceedings of
144Acomparison of progressivity of an entire tax system of one country with
that of another country is useful in the differential sense described in Section Il-A
above, but only if the differences are gross enough to suggest that a transfer of the
tax system of Country A to Country B would yield results in Country B, relative
to those observed under B's existing system, much the same as it does yield in
Country A. If, for example, the price elasticity of supply of highly paid executives
is much greater in A than in B (perhaps because in A such persons can more easily
migrate to similar jobs in other countries), and if A's existing tax system is,
according to its rate schedule, much more progressive at the salary levels of these
executives than is that of B, it would be a mistake to think of A's system as being
really much more progressive than B's.A's executives, those that remain in
Country A, will have recouped part, or all, of the higher progressivity through
tax-induced higher salaries.
145RichardA. Musgrave, Fiscal Systems. New Haven, Yale University Press,
1969, Chapters 5—7.
146FredericL. Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist
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the conference held by The Brookings Institution and the National
Bureau: "Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth." 147
Musgraveposes a theory of the circumstances governing the ratio
of direct to indirect taxes. He then concludes that the empirical evidence
is "well in line with expectations."Theevidence consists, first, of a
historical study of the development of the tax structures in selected
countries (United Kingdom, United States, and Germany); and second,
a cross-sectional study of thirty to forty countries. The expectations ful-
filled are, however, only those that are expressed in terms both so gen-
eral and so obvious that if the evidence had contradicted the expecta-
tions, one would have been tempted to suspect the evidence, not the
expectations. Some of the more detailed parts of the expectational
section are not covered by the data and—if they had been—would, I
think, have been contradicted here and there in a manner that would
open all kinds of interesting inquiries: for example, the proportion of tax
revenue raised by taxes on land in the less developed countries. The
cross-sectional data are broken down only into indirect taxes (including
customs duties), customs duties listed separately, corporation income
tax, personal income tax, and social security taxes.
Pryor, in his monumental cross-sectional study of government ex-
penditures, tests, by regressions, for effect of tax structure on expendi-
tures, but finds no statistically significant relationships, except that be-
tween total direct personal taxes and expenditures, which he concludes
"seems to reflect the discovery of Aaron...thatsocial insurance
expenditures are related to tied taxes." 149
TheBrookings-Bureau study on taxstructures and economic
growth illustrates another difficulty in drawing boundaries that will in-
clude only quantitative studies. Although these conference papers are
essentially descriptions of tax structures, with emphasis on tax measures
taken with the aim of promoting economic growth, and although they,
therefore, contain neither a priori models nor data for testing such
models, they are helpful to the public-finance scholar in ways additional
to those supplied by Musgrave's regressions. They suggest new quantita-
tive insights, open new avenues to explore, and stimulate that untidy
mixture of introspection, general observation, and intuition on which
most of us probably still rely, in the main.
147Seenote 86 above.
148Musgrave,op. cit., pp. 155—56.
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III. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
C. The Search for "Laws" of Government Expenditures
Quantitative studies of government expenditures fall chiefly into
two groups. In one, the studies have sought to ascertain whether there is
a tendency in the private-enterprise economies, as distinguished from the
socialist economies, for per capita government-expenditures to rise over
time faster than per capita national income or per capita GNP. The
second group of studies has attempted to isolate the influence of each
of many variables in addition to per capita income: degree of urbaniza-
tion, amount of aid received from higher-level governments, and the
like. They have been concerned usually with states and local units,
particularly cities, rather than with country-to-country comparisons.
(1) Variation of Government Expenditures with Per Capita In-
come. The first group of studies take off from Wagner's somewhat
ambiguous assertion, which has become known as the law of increasing
government expenditures. Wagner's data, on the whole, may not have
indicated much more than the likelihood that, as per capita income rises,
government expenditure per capita rises at least as rapidly.'5° In recent
years, cross-section studies comparing countries with differing per capita
incomes at a given time have been attempted, in order to answer in-
directly the question of variation over time; though it is recognized that
today countries are subject to worldwide cultural, and other influences,
which make cross-section conclusions not particularly comparable with
those drawn from a time series for one country.
Recently, however, the field of inquiry has been remarkably wid-
ened by Pryor's cross-section study, which compares private-enterprise
economies with socialist economies, and compares the structure of serv-
ices rendered by government in the various countries. (See paragraph
below.)
Of the time-series studies, the most provocative and potentially im-
portant is the Peacock-Wiseman analysis of United Kingdom govern-
ment expenditures from 1890 to the post-World War II period.'51 Their
conclusion that crisis periods, notably war, condition taxpayers to a
150 For a detailed critique of Wagner's "law" see Herbert Timm, "Das Gesetz
der wachsenden Staatsausgaben," Finanzarchiv, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Sept., 1961), pp.
201—47.
A. T. Peacock and J. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditures in
the United Kingdom. National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton University
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level of taxes that continues to be acceptable—particularly if per capita
incomes are rising, and if social consciences have been stirred by war's
hardships—in a postwar period for additions to peaceful types of gov-
ernment expenditures is indeed plausible; although I have argued else-
where 152 that "at some points the displacement effect seems to be de-
fined implicitly in terms, not of share of government expediture in
GNP, but of government expenditure per head (after deflating for price
changes) 153In any case, in projecting U.K. government expenditures,
Peacock and Wiseman sensibly make no use of the displacement
hypothesis, on the implicit assumption that there will not again be a war
like World War II. The assumptions they do use in their projections give
a result that implies that the U.K. will devote a strikingly large propor-
tion of incremental GNP to private uses.'54 Further work now in process
in this field may clarify some of these issues.'55
Cross-section studies (Pryor aside)[see paragraph below] have
become successively more discouraging in their search for some relation-
ship between the government's share in the national income and the
country's per capita income. Musgrave's cross-section analysis 156 led
him to conclude that, that share—at least, for current expenditures as
distinct from capital expenditures—rises with per capita GNP for his
sample as a whole; but that the relation breaks down for the subsample of
countries with per capita incomes below $300, and for those with per
capita incomes of above $600 (where it even becomes negative). Finally,
the most recent and extensive study for developing countries, covering
forty-six countries with per capita GNP ranging from $38 (Malawi) to
$661 (Japan), has given disappointing results. Out of the 222 correla-
152 In a reviewofthe Peacock-WisemanbookappearinginThe British Tax
Review (March-April, 1962), Pp. 126—27. See Pryor's test of the displacement
effect, and his critique, which focuses on government expenditure per capita,
op.cit., pp.443—46.
153 Shoup, bc. cit., p. 126.
154 Ibid., p. 127.
155 See J. Veverka, "The Growth of Government Expenditure in the United
Kingdom since 1790," in Alan T. Peacock and D. I. Robertson, eds., Public
Expenditure: Appraisal and Control.London,Oliver & Boyd, 1963; and by the
same author, "The Growth of Government Expenditure in the United Kingdom in
the 19th Century," ScottishJournalof Political Economy, Vol. X, No. 1,1963 (re-
printedfor private circulation by the London School of Economics and Political
Science,the University of London,and the Department of Economics, University
ofYork), pp. 111—127.
156Fiscal Systems, pp.110—24. See also the other works in this field citedby
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tions tried, only 13 were found significant at the 10 per cent level in re-
lating per capita GNP to government expenditures or subdivisions
thereof—expressed as a percentage of GNP; or, for particular services.
as a percentage of total government expenditure.'57
These inconclusive results may prove quite useful in forcing us to
inquire more carefully into cultural factors and economic patterns that
are not well reflected in simple figures of per capita income, but which
doubtless affect the share of government in the economy.
The Colin Clark 25 per cent limit on the over-all tax rate,158 de-
rived by him from somewhat scanty data a good many•years ago, is
closely allied to the issue of the government's share in total output. His
hypothesis that, once past the 25 per cent limit, the society opts for
inflationary financing rather than more taxes, suggests that there is a
similar limit of about the same size on the government's share, however
financed. But the persistence of inflationary financing in many countries
in peacetime shows that the concept of a tax-limit ratio is not neces-
sarily the same, in its practical consequences, as the concept of a limit to
the government's share in total output. If there is such a share-limit, it
is, I think, more likely to be determined by whether the government
supplies, chiefly, services to business firms or, mainly, services directly
to consumers. The limit may, in principle, be very high indeed in the
former case.159
Pryor's book is in a class by itself in the field now under discussion.
An accurate appraisal of his findings will take some time, so ambitious
and extensive is his coverage. The basic question is, therefore, the degree
to which the limitations of the data available to him render the regres-
sion findings overly subject to qualification. But even if that were to turn
out to be so, the book would still be important, owing to the manner in
which Pryor has spelled out the problems of interpreting the data, has
discussed the various types of government services, and has offered other
qualitative analyses of his quantitative project.
Taking public consumption expenditures (which excludes public
investment expenditures, government subsidies, and sales by government
organs to the population), Pryor compares seven "market" economies
S. Lall, "A Note on Government Expenditures in Developing Countries,"
Economic Journal (June, 1969), pp. 413—17.
158 "Public Finance and the Value of Money," Economic Journal (Dec.,
1945), pp. 371—89. For a critique of Clark's theory, see Joseph A. Pechman and
Thomas Mayer, "Mr. CoHn Clark on the Limits of Taxation," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics (Aug., 1952), pp. 232—42.
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and seven "centrally planned" economies with respect to the share of
GNP taken in these expenditures; and in certain types of these expendi-
tures—notably expenditures for defense, for welfare and health, and for
education. The differences between the private-enterprise economies and
(in my terminology) the socialist economies are not great: probably
much smaller than most people, perhaps most economists, would have
thought.16°
(2) Variation of Government Expenditures with Variables Other
than Per Capita Income.Since per capita income seems, at best, to
have a very limited explanatory power for differences in government
spending as a share in total spending, it is encouraging to see that the
initial attempts to add other explanatory variables—by Fabricant in
1952,161 for interstate differences in the United States; and the similarly
pioneering study by Brazer in 1959,162 for intercity differences—have
been followed by a considerable number of regression studies in the
1960's, which search for further associative or causal factors. But most
of these studies do not pose directly the question of the government's
share in total output; they ask, rather, how may a dollar increase in per
capita government-expenditure be explained? It might be "completely
explained" by variation in per capita income, yet the share of govern-
ment in the total output might be rising, falling, or remaining constant.
Fabricant employed per capita income, urbanization (percentage of
population in communities of over 2,500) and density of population,
and found that they accounted for a little over 70 per cent of the vari-
ance among states in per capita total expenditures,163 income being
overwhelmingly the most important factor. What made Fabricant's study
of special interest was his breakdown by major types of government
service, where substantial explanatory differences were found. Thus,
expenditures per capita on fire protection, sanitation, and welfare were
influenced chiefly by urbanization, not by income, or by density, which
never ranked higher than second, and then only. for schools and health
and hospitals.'°4
160 For a summary of Pryor's findings, and a critique, see the review of his
book by Ronald B. Gold, The Journal of Finance (Dec., 1969), pp. 1032—34.
161 Solomon Fabricant, assisted by Robert E. Lipsey, The Trend of Govern-
ment Activity in the United States since 1900. New York, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1952, pp. 122—29.
162 Harvey E. Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States. Occasional
Paper 66. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959.
103 Op. cit., p. 123.
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What Fabricant had done for interstate differences, Brazer did for
intercity differences, in somewhat more detail. First, he took account of
a number of social and economic forces, without attempting to attach
precise explanatory power to each of these, by dividing his 462 cities
(all but 19 of the total in 1951 with populations over 25,000) into
seven groups, defined by the characteristics of core-city, large and smail
metropolitan area, high and low income residential suburb, industrial
suburb, city outside a metropolitan area, and resort city. Variance analy-
sis indicated a systematic association between per capita expenditures
and the "nature, or type classification, of the city."
Second,Brazer applied multiple regression analysis to the 462
cities, to those of the group in each of three states (California, Massa-
chusetts, and Ohio), and to 40 cities of over 250,000 population, with
their overlapping local governments. The explanatory variables included
two employed by Fabricant (density of population, and income—but
median family income, rather than per capita income) and four others:
population size; rate of population growth; ratio of employment in
manufacturing, trade, and service to population; and intergovernmental
revenue per capita. The variables to be explained were: 1951 per capita
total general operating expenditures; and operating expenditures per
capita for police and fire protection, streets and highways, recreation,
general control, sanitation, and the combined common functions. Ob-
viously, we are here far advanced in degree of detail from the studies
noted above that compare countries, but we are still not dealing directly
with variations in the share of the community's total output taken by
government.
The chief explanatory variables turned out to be density, median
family income, and intergovernmental revenue per capita. (This sum-
mary, of necessity, omits many important details discovered by Brazer.)
In the 40-city study, where three additional explanatory variables were
used, Brazer found that "the smaller the proportion of the metropolitan
area's population that lives in the central city, the higher its per capita
expenditures tend to be."
The field opened up by F.abricant and Brazer was rapidly exploited
in the 1960's, as computers became more available, and as state-local
fiscal difficulties increased, especially at the urban level. More than any
HarveyB. Brazer, "Factors Affecting City Expenditures," Proceedings,
Fiftieth Annual Conference on Taxation, National Tax Association, 1957, p. 440.
For citation of the complete study, see footnote 162 above.
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other area of public finance, this field is now in what might be called a
theoretic quantitative flux. Monographs and articles have followed hard
on one another, each challenging the findings of its predecessor(s),
especially with respect to the response of state and local governments to
grants from a higher-level government. It is not possible to summarize
here the intricate developments in the literature contributed by Barlow,
Bolton, Gramlich, Harris, Oates, Osman, Sacks, Thurow, and others,
but two aspects recently emphasized may be singled out as being im-
portant technically.io?
First, the conclusion reached in some of the studies, that consider-
able influence on government spending can be attributed to receipt of
grants in aid, may have to be reconsidered in those cases where this
explanatory variable is expressed in absolute terms (either as total
amount, or total per capita), instead of as a proportion of total local
expenditure. For example, even in the absence of any causal effect run-
fling from aid to local spending, one would expect a richer state to
exhibit both a larger local expenditure per capita, and a larger amount
of state aid to local units per capita.
Second, as the search for explanatory variables has widened, the
danger arises that for any particular cross-section-analysis set of data,
some set of assumed causal agents can be found that will, in toto, seem to
explain the variations in local spending, but that in reality show a good
deal of chance association, rather than causality. This danger arises
from the fact that, until recently, these studies have lacked an a priori
behavioral-definitional model to be tested. This gap is being overcome
with the aid of models that set up utility functions for the governments
in question, to be maximized subject to certain types of budget re-
straint.'°8
167Theimmediately following paragraphs are based to a considerable degree
on the analysis and findings of Stephen Dresch, of the National Bureau of
Economic Research. See also the forthcoming volume by Dresch and Raymond
Struyk. Neither of these authors is responsible for the paraphrasing and com-
ments in this text.
168See,especially, the empirical work of Edward M. Gramlich, "State and
Local Governments and Their Budget Constraint," international Economic Review,
Vol. 10, No. 2 (June, 1969), pp. 163—82; his "Alternative Federal Policies for
Stimulating State and Local Expenditures: A Comparison of Their Effects,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June, 1968), pp. 119—29; and "A Clarifica-
tion and a Correction," National Tax Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June, 1969), pp.
286—90. On the theoretical side, see James A. Wilde, "The Expenditure Effects of
Grants-in-Aid Programs," National Tax Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sept., 1968),
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H. Trends and Time Series of Government Expenditures
in Particular Countries
The studies of trends and time series of government expenditures
that are the subject of this section differ from those discussed in Section
G (above) in that they seek less for specific causal relationships and
more for a general understanding of the changing level and structure of
government expenditure, whatever the causes. It is correspondingly more
difficult to summarize or appraise these studies, and the present section
merely calls attention to some of the more significant of them: those by
Fabricant (already noted in another context),'69 Kendrick and Wehle,'7°
and Andic and Veverka(without implying that those not noted here
are all of less
These studies deal, inter alia, with trends in the number of govern-
ment employees and their distribution among the several government
functions,173 recognizing, of course, that trends in government employ-
ment can be different—even opposite in sign—from total government
expenditures.
I. Quantitative Aspects of Government Services
as Distinguished from Government Expenditures
(Output, as Distinguished from Money Input)
There are few data, and little in the way of conceptual analysis
concerning government services, i.e., government output, as distinguished
from government expenditures—which are simply figures on money
input. Time-series and cross-section studies of amounts spent, total or
per capita, on education, police, and other services, tell us, by them-
selves, nothing about the level of the service rendered, since the data are
160 See footnote 161 above.
M. Slade Kendrick, assisted by Mark Wehie, A Century and a Half of
Federal Expenditures. Occasional Paper 48. National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1955.
171 Suphan Andic and Jindrich Veverka, "The Growth of Government Expen-
diture in Germany Since the Unification," Finanzarchiv, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jan.,
1964), pp. 169—278.
112 For an extensive bibliography on recent empirical studies of public expen-
ditures, see Pryor, op. cit., pp. 446—51.
173 For particular studies of this point, see Solomon Fabricant, The Rising
Trend of Government Employment. Occasional Paper 29. National Bureau of
Economic Research, New York, 1949; and M. Abramovitz and Vera F. Eliasberg,
Growthof Public Employmentin Great Britain. National Bureau of Economic
Research. Princeton University Press, 1957.Public Expenditures and Taxation 49
only for inputs. We lack, on the whole, analogues to the physical units
found in much of the private sector (tons of coal, numbers of trucks
of a certain specification), because government output—at least, that
part distributed free of charge—consists almost entirely of services, not
commodities. But we lack also the dollar-sales figures of the kind avail-
able for services supplied in the private sector, which reflect consumer
demand, and which, therefore, are an aid to measuring the output of
an industry, say, retail trade.
This general observation is not invalidated by the wealth of cost-
benefit studies that have marked the past few decades in the United
States. Most of these studies have been concerned with marketable types
of output, not group-consumption goods (nonexciusion goods). Also,
the outputs have been definable in physical units. Value per unit has
been assigned by reference to private-sector analogues, or by observing
the reduction in costs they make possible in the private-sector activity
that uses them, since most of these government services in cost-benefit
analyses have been intermediate goods. When the same technique has
been applied, sometimes under the name of PPB (program-planning-
budgeting, which actually embraces much more than cost-benefit analy-
sis), to those government departments dispensing pure public goods,
e.g., the State Department, it has there proved unworkable or extremely
difficult to apply, as a method of ascertaining cost per unit of output.
Cost comparison of alternative methods of accomplishing a specified
task is, of course, possible even in these cases, but this bypasses the
problem of defining units of output.
For these reasons, most of the cost-benefit analyses have seemed
to me to lie outside the discipline of public finance, at any rate as I am
inclined to define it: namely, one of the economy's resource-allocating
systems that makes little use of the pricing mechanism in drawing re-
sources from the economy and reallocating them through free services
and transfer payments.'74
The same remarks are applicable to services that the government,
although supplying them free of direct charge, dispenses in the market-
ing mode, i.e., a mode whereby the amount of the service in question
can be rationed, consumer by consumer, and is in fact so rationed—
though by direct rationing, rather than by the impersonal price system.
Education and garbage removal are examples. Government renders
these services in this mode because they produce externalities (e.g., im-
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proved milieu) that are not marketable, and parfly as a means of redis-
tributing wealth and income. The basic services, education, garbage
removal, and the like, while differing among themselves in the ease with
which a unit of output can be defined, do not offer the difficulties in-
herent in defining a unit of output of a service rendered in the group-
consumption (nonexciudability) mode, where exclusion of any particu-
lar individual is not feasible: for example, police protection, fire protec-
tion, and (now we deal with collective-consumption goods, where the
addition of one more consumer to the group does not change total cost)
defense, public health, and exploration of space. Accordingly, although
we have some definitions of unit of output, and quantitative studies of
cost per unit, for free services rendered in the marketing mode,'75 there
is relatively little of either for those government services supplied in the
nonmarketing mode.'T°
J. Changes in Efficiency in the Government Sector
This section is included in the present monograph more for its
intrinsic interest as a quantitative problem yet to be solved than for the
attempts made thus far to grapple with it. That these attempts have
175See,e.g., J. A. Kershaw and R. N. McKean, Systems Analysis and Educa-
tion. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, 1959; some of the papersin Howard 0.
Schaller, ed., Public Expenditure Decisions in the Urban Community. Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, especially those by Werner Z. Hirsch; and Werner Z.
Hirsch, The Econo,nics of State and Local Government. New York, McGraw-Hill,
1970.
See,however, Burton A. Weisbrod, Economics of Public Health. Phila-
delphia, of Pennsylvania Press,1963; and, for concepts of output,
Shoup, Public Finance, pp. 102—27. A promising empirical study recently com-
pleted is that by Raul Treviño-Westendarp, "On the Distribution of Free Govern-
mental Services: Police Protection in New York City." New York, Columbia
University; Doctoral Dissertation, 1970. Treviño-Westendarp deals with definition
and measurement of crime, units of output, police deployment, and the degree to
which the deployment in New York City, as given for a single date (no other data
are publicly available) would, if continued, resemble the deployments that would
occur under each of three potentially conflicting criteria for deployment: equal
crime rates in all precincts, minimum crime rate for the City as a whole, and
equal work-load. Owing to the unwillingness of the police department to release
data on deployment, this study chiefly indicates how these quantitative aspects
could be examined, rather than itself providing definitive answers with respect to
the results of differing deployment patterns (deployment by area, and by time
periods during the day). Similar questions are raised, and data are obtained that
give partial answers, in Sam Book, "Taxation of Commuters in New York City."
New York, Columbia University; Doctoral Dissertation, 1969. See Section V below.Public Expenditures and Taxation 51
been few and inconclusive is to be expected from what has been noted
in Section I (above) about lack of data, or even concepts, on units of
output. Efficiency rises when a government succeeds in increasing the
number of units of output of a certain service from a given money value
of input. Without a definition of a unit of output, changes in efficiency
cannot be measured even conceptually.
But trends over time can perhaps be implied, as Fabricant at-
tempted to do, by his "intuitive weighing of changes that tend to
decrease productivity, e.g., decline in hours worked per week (if 'input'
is measured not in man-hours but in man-weeks) and those that tend to
increase productivity, e.g., apparently favorable changes in administra-
tive methods...Onthis basis Fabricant.. .concludesthat for the
period 1900—1940, 'The net result probably has been a decline in input
relative to output.' "
IV.NEEDS AND PROSPECTS FOR RESEARCH
The following appraisal of the needs, prospects, and outlets for quanti-
tative research in government expenditures and taxation (based on the
summaries above) is offered as a personal, subjective reaction, liable
to change upon discussion. Still, in order to avoid cumbersome repeti-
tion, the propositions below will be stated almost as flatly as if they were
revealed truths.
1. Each quantitative study will say whether: (1) it employs off-
the-shelf data to illustrate or suggest a new, or a modified, theory of
causal relationships; or (2) it obtains a set of observations in a manner
designed to test a theory that has been developed without reference to
these observations; or (3) it brings together data that, under correlation
or regression analysis, reveal associations that may prove useful for
policy guidance, even though there is no a priori model that would help
reveal the particular causal relations, if any (black-box empiricism).
The distinction between (2) and (3) is illustrated by the differences
described in Section lI-B (above) of the various studies on shifting and
incidence.
The Type 3 study (no a priori model) will, no doubt, continue to
be used in some fields where a priori models are very difficult to con-
struct, notably in the study of historical and cross-sectional differences in
levels and structures of public expenditures. But, in most of the other
177Quotedfrom Shoup, Public Finance, p. 77; the inner quote comes from
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fields of public finance, the future seems to lie more with the Type 2
study, where an a priori structure of behavioral and definitional equa-
tions is first constructed, and then tested. This approach seems promising
for further studies of effects of grants-in-aid; shifting and incidence; and
effects of taxation on investment, on other business behavior, and on
supply of labor; and other household reactions. The degree to which
these models are truly tested will, no doubt, vary widely. Near one
extreme, the model may do no more than establish a set of plausible
relationships in the presence of a number of exogenous variables; and
after real-life figures are fed into the model, the end data that it yields
will be subject to an intuitive appraisal for reasonableness.'78 Near the
other extreme lie techfliques of testing that have been developed by
econometricians, yielding conclusions which writers without specialized
training in that field will have to take more or less on faith. When the
experts differ (see Section 11-C above), we shall have to suspend judg-
ment until they resolve their differences.
How quickly we may expect results from Type 2 inquiries (a priori
models) evidently depends not so much on development of further
expertise in the field of public finance as on advances in econometric
techniques for testing the model.
As to Type 1studies—the evoking, or expanding, of parts of
theoretical structures from facts that have been assembled for general
purposes (e.g., as in Statistics of Income)—this is more a matter of
theoretical public finance than it is of quantitative, or empirical, public
finance. If it is observed that a tax on value added—of the consumption
type—does not usually show the same base in national income data for
any one year as does a tax on all labor income (it being recognized,
nevertheless, that both taxes exempt either capital goods or the net
return from capital goods), the result up to that point is a priori rather
than quantitative. Such a result has obviously arisen in part from what
might be called general observation of facts. This approach, helpful to
the construction of a priori models needed in the Type 2 study, seems
broadly applicable to all the sectors of public finance discussed above.
2. The quantitative questions posed will be more nearly completely
specified than they have often been in the past. In the Type 2 studies,
the models will be more surely closed. They still will not be general-
equilibrium models in the Wairasian sense, since they will contain certain
118Anillustration is the project being planned by Stephen Dresch and Carl S.
Shoup, at the National Bureau, to estimate some of the distributive effects of
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exogenous variables; but, at least, they will not leave any of the impor-
tant exogenous variables unmentioned (e.g., Where is the money to
finance revenue-sharing coming from?). In the Type 3 studies (black-
box studies) the phenomenon that is being described will be more
broadly defined (see the critique in Section Il-B above).
3. Field experiments of the type conducted by Mathematica, Inc.
and the University of Wisconsin for ascertaining the effect of a negative
income tax on work incentives [under the sponsorship of the Office of
Economic Opportunity maybe attempted on an increasing scale.
Public finance is one field where the sponsors, i.e., governmental units,
may have funds available on a large enough scale to make such studies
possible. All kinds of intriguing research projects spring to mind, some
of which would, most likely, be socially unacceptable: e.g., exempting
from income tax for twenty years or so, certain executives and profes-
sional men, while taxing a control group of those types. This is a rough
road, surely; and it may not prove fruitful—but who knows? Govern-
ments are continually providing us with changes in tax laws and expend-
iture programs that may be viewed for our purposes as experiments,
the control group consisting of those in the time period before (or after)
the change. But, here, the technique merges into that of Type 2 described
above, with econometric
4. The quantitative studies can be divided into those that deal with
recorded, and observed, changes: for example, changes in prices or
employment; and those that deal with things that are never a matter of
record, e.g., the amount of excess burden. Research foundations will, we
may hope, be sympathetic to the latter type of study, since it is quite
unlikely to gain much financial support from governments.
5.Asto outlets for future quantitative research, and sources of
funds, we may assume that government departments will increase their
efforts in the fields of taxation and government expenditure, given the
increasing recognition in policy circles of the need for information. But
what of the large private research or research-fostering organizations,
e.g., the National Bureau of Economic Research and The Brookings
Institution? Although they have in recent years spent considerable sums
of money on this kind of research, and might therefore be expected to
reduce their commitments in these areas, it seems to me that, again, the
pressures are too great to allow this: pressures from policy-makers, the
170Theproject is being directed by Harold W. Watts, director of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Poverty Research Institute. For a summary of preliminary find-
ings, see Business Week (Feb. 28, 1970), pp. 80—82.54 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
public—and, of course, the academic world—to give quantitative an-
swers, even if only approximate, to the urgent questions being posed in
public finance. I am inclined to predict, therefore, that these organiza-
tions and others like them, here and abroad, will soon decide to reenter
the public finance field on a fairly large scale, but with a somewhat
different emphasis from that of the studies of the sixties, namely, an
emphasis now on what has been termed above the closed model: a study
of the effects of substituting one tax for another, of financing a stipulated
increase in a certain type of expenditure by a stipulated tax, and so on.
No doubt there will be some delay in getting such studies under
way if only because it will prove much more difficult to plan and staff
closed-model studies than it was to do so with respect to studies each of
which considered only one tax, or only one aspect of a tax, or but one
type of government expenditure. More diverse talents and interests will
have to be enlisted simultaneously for any one closed-model study.
Moreover, even the simplest of such projects are likely to prove too
much for any small group of individual scholars in a particular university
(for example) on their own. The role of institutions such as the Na-
tional Bureau and Brookings will for these reasons be, I think, even
more important in the future than they have been in the past.
6. Outlets, if not financing, for quantitative public finance studies
that are on a smaller scale than those envisaged in the preceding para-
graph are now being provided by the scholarly journals in public finance
and economics to a far greater extent than a few years ago. In the
March, 1970, issue of the National Tax Journal, for example, three of
the eleven articles included tests of hypotheses, and several of the others
included formal models. At the same time, editors are willing to give
space to conceptual or analytical articles in taxation and government
expenditures, even those devoid of models. The June, 1970, issue of the
American Economic Review contains four articles of this kind, and
another with a model, but nonquantitative.
V. THE ROLE OF QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF TAXATION
OR GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN THE
FORMULATION OF POLICY
The questions to which this section is addressed are: What has been,
and what will be, the role of quantitative research in taxation and gov-
ernmental expenditures (excluding fiscal policy, and debt) in the formu-
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on:(1) distribution of taxation, transfer payments, and free government
services by income classes, geographic groups, or other groups; (2) the
shifting and incidence of taxes, transfer payments, and free government
services; (3) the effects of taxation and subsidies or free services on
growth (as shown by the effects on investment and other business-firm
behavior), on the supply of labor, and on efficiency in the allocation of
resources in the sense of avoiding unnecessary ("excess") loss of output
("loss of welfare" in the economist's terms)? We are also interested in
comparative studies of tax systems and government expenditure systems
from one country to another, or in one country over time, partly because
of a search for "laws" of government-expenditure growth, and for
measures of changes in efficiency in government.
As explained in the main body of this paper, quantitative work has
apparently been concentrated, at least until recently, in the first two areas
mentioned: distribution of taxation, transfer payments, and to a lesser
degree, free government services, by income classes or geographic
groups; and the shifting and incidence of particular taxes. (Almost no
attention has been paid to the shifting and incidence of subsidies, and of
free government services.) Let us speculate, first, what the impact of
these studies has been on policy; and second, what it may be in the
years ahead.
The influence of these distribution studies has not been very great
if we are to judge by a comparison of what the tables for the United
States drawn up in the 1930's and 1940's show in comparison with the
tables for recent years. It might have been thought that the very uneven
distribution of disposable income, coupled with the apparent finding
that some 10 to 20 per cent of the income of poverty-level groups was
being taken in taxation, would have stirred the community to action,
diminishing that percentage. But this has not happened. Perhaps policy-
makers recognized the logicalfallacythat underlies a singletax-
distribution table.' (See Section II of this paper.) More likely, they
turned their attention, quite properly, to means by which the disposable
income of the lowest income-groups could be altered by changes in the
tax system, and concluded that there were too many institutional diffi-
culties in the way, including the need of local governments for the
property tax, and the role of payroll taxes in enlisting support for the
old-age and unemployment-compensation programs. Instead, an en-
hanced use of transfer payments to the poor has been employed. (The
next step may well be a redistribution of free government services—
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poor.) It may be doubted, however, that this growth in transfer pay-
ments would have been much less if the tax distribution tables had never
been constructed. All that was needed to stimulate the growth of trans-
fer payments was the last column of such tables, showing disposable
incomes by income classes. Whatever the reason for that degree of
poverty, some action to mitigate it was evidently deemed desirable.
I would conjecture that in the future, the chief use of tax and trans-
fer-payment distribution tables will be to indicate by how much the
distribution of disposable income might be altered by postulated changes
in that system. This implies the construction of alternative tables—not
just one table—and the exercise will be only as useful as our knowledge
of differential incidence allows it to be. Moreover, to be of greatest use
for policy, these distribution tables must include something entirely
new, i.e., some monetary expression (hopefully, in output terms, and if
not that, in input terms) of the distribution of police protection, fire
protection, education, and other government services that are not in the
special category in which consumption of the service by one person
neither impairs nor enhances the consumption of that same good by an-
other person in the same group. It is in this direction, and in the increas-
ing use of subsidy-type transfer payments (as opposed to transfer pay-
ments directly to households for general purposes) that there lies, in
my view, the greatest promise for an important reduction in inequality of
real total disposable income.'80
But we encounter severe difficulties in this field of estimating the
distribution of free government services, and they are not—as is com-
monly believed—primarily conceptual ones. To be sure, it will always
be difficult to define units of output of a government service, and to
place a money value on such a unit. But the real roadblock, at present,
is the extreme reluctance of state and local government authorities,
chiefly the officials of large cities, to release to public-finance scholars
the data they already have, to say nothing of spending money to collect
additional data. One can appreciate their reluctance, for the distributive
issues involved in these studies are explosive, politically and socially.
In a recent research project that I supervised, the police department of
New York City proved courteous, but quite unresponsive, regarding re-
quests for data other than those which had already appeared in the press,
on deployment of police and police equipment among precincts.181 While
180 Shoup, Public Finance, pp. 58 1—588.
181 See footnote 176 above. The Rand Corporation, at that time employed by
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theremay be good short-term reasons for not making such information
available (though I doubt that the criminal element scans many doctoral
dissertations on microfilm for tips on where to operate), the long-run
interests of the city officials, and, more to the point, of households and
firms in the city, are crucially involved in the present shortsighted policy
so common at the state and local level, with respect to data on distribu-
tion of certain state and local free governmental services.
Meanwhile, on the tax-transfer-payment front, more and more data
are being made available, and studied—with the lamentable exception
of subsidies, which seem to have been subject to very little serious
quantitative analysis in terms of incidence; and, hence, also in terms of
distribution by income or geographic classes (the maritime subsidies, for
example). In other fields, the federal government has held for many
years to an enlightened policy. Consider, for example, our Statistics of
Income series. No other country in the world comes even close to the
United States in the volume, quality, and skill in arrangement of data
that mark this extraordinary series of quantitative information on taxa-
tiOn.182 There have been times, particularly during the economy regime
of Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, in the 1950's, when Statistics
of Income was threatened with reduction on a scale that would have left
it distinctly second rate; but, happily, these pressures were successfully
resisted. As a result, Congress and the executive branch have been able
to compute the impact—if not the final incidence—of countless measures
of tax reform, large and small, discarded or enacted, and of alternative
programs to increase or decrease total federal tax revenues. In volume,
and in influence on policy, these largely unpublished studies of impact
distribution have almost surely been more influential in policy formula-
tion than all the distribution studies published in scholarly journals and
books. What we see in published form is but the tip of the iceberg, with
respect to studies of distribution and other effects of proposed federal tax
measures.
Many of the quantitative analyses made by the Office of Tax
Analysis and the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue are
courteous but either unable to obtain, or relatively uninterested in obtaining, data
on what appeared to Treviño-Westendarp and myself as the basic issues of equity
and efficiency.
182Also,no other government, to my knowledge, possesses a tax analysis
organization of thesizeand professional competence of the United States
Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis, founded in 1938 under the title of Division of
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of tax changes sufficiently small to allow the micro approach, where the
use made of the increment, or decrement, in taxation can be neglected
without incurring substantial error. Other branches of the federal gov-
ernment have produced a large amount of quantitative work on transfer
payments (again, subsidies excepted), and, where transfer measures of
large scope have been involved, a sophisticated macro approach has
been
But our optimism fOr future work on the distribution of income
under differential tax, or transfer-payments, systems, or under different
patterns of distributing certain free government services, cools consider-
ably when we recall that these findings depend on the incidence assump-
tions that underlie them.
In taxation, quantitative research in incidence with respect to
broad-based taxes has reached a most confusing stage. One who is not
trained in econometrics may be made more pessimistic than he should
be by the extent of disagreement among those econometricians who have
worked on the incidence of the corporation income tax, or the effects of
tax incentives in the federal income-tax law, but he has a right to be
wary, particularly when the precise definition of what it is that they are
measuring is not made clear.
Under these circumstances it seems premature to ask whether these
types of empirical work on corporation tax incidence, so-called, will
influence policy. They have not done so, and probably should not, in the
present state of our knowledge. We still depend, in our own policy
recommendations, I suspect, on simple little models that we carry around
with us, unequipped with estimated coefficients.
Turning to transfer payments, we note that payments to households
have been studied largely on an impact basis, without much considera-
tion, for example, of how much of such payments is "shifted," i.e., lost,
to landlords and others. As pointed out above, transfer payments to
business firms in the form of subsidies have been studied hardly at all as
to their incidence; although elementary supply-demand analysis suggests
that any subsidy to a particular industry, like any tax on a particular
industry, will go partly to consumers and partly to economic-rent re-
cipients in that industry, according to the relative elasticities of supply
and demand. As to free government services, even the impact distribu-
SeeBenjamin Bridges, Jr., Current Redistributional Effects of Old-Age
Income Assurance Program. Social Security Administration, Washington, D.C.,
1968; and W. V. Vroman, Macroeconomic Effects of SocialInsuranceon Aggregate
Demand.SocialSecurity Administration, Washington, D.C., 1969.Public Expenditures and Taxation 59
tion remains to be determined; and then comes the task of a priori
qualitative analysis of "shifting" possibilities; i.e., loss of benefit through
operation of market forces.184Finally,perhaps, some quantitative
analyses will emerge.'85
Perhaps, the first step must be a sort of revolution in supply
analysis. In a recent conversation with an economist who is in charge of
planning for a large industrial concern, I inquired whether what he had
learned from economic theory was of use to him in his present work.
His reply was an emphatic affirmative with respect to the demand side
(both micro and macro), and just as emphatic a negative with respect
to supply. Not even the latest treatises on types of imperfect competition
seem to have come close enough to reality, though it is possible that
some of the recent work in decision-making will prove invaluable. Very
likely, the basic trouble is that the economics profession grossly under-
rates the amount of effort needed to understand industry, and individual-
firm, supply conditions in a complex industrial—service—raw-materials
economy of two-hundred million persons, where the incorporated sector
accounts for about three-quarters of the pretax profits of total busi-
ness,'8° and a small number of corporations account for most of this.'87
Until we know far more than we do now about how the supply decisions
are made in the large multiproduct corporations, we may not be able to
construct the improved behavioral models that must be tested by an
econometric appeal to the facts. (Let us recall that a monopoly has no
supply schedule, only a cost schedule.) Economic research costing in the
tens of millions of dollars, and extending over several decades, is prob-
ably what is needed, but we have neither the money nor the economists,
as yet. Even a crude preliminary approach based on what we already
know is so costly, running into the millions, and faces so great a risk of
failure to get anywhere, that recent proposals along this line are, of
necessity, being closely reexamined as to their feasibility.'88
The next step may be, instead, to build even cruder, simpler models,
184 Shoup, PublicFinance,pp. 86—93.
185 See footnote 176 above.
186 Statistics of Income, 1965, Preliminary, Corporation Income Tax Returns,
p. 2 (net income before tax, 1965, $74.2 billion); Statistics of Income, 1965,Pre-
liminary, United States Business Tax Returns: Sole Proprietorships and Partner-
ships, p. 1 (net profit before individual income tax, $27.9 billion).
187 See footnote 109 above.
188 An exampleisthe Bossons-Shoup tax-substitution general-equilibrium
project described in the Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
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to learn more about what it is we need to know, before much progress
can be made in quantitative differential-incidence for broad-based tax
substitutions.
Meanwhile, whenever changes in micro taxes—certain excises, for
example—are to occur, government or foundation resources should be
mobilized to study price changes, without waiting for individual scholars
to do what they can on their own. This remark applies particularly to
state and local governments. It may also be applicable to small changes
in the rate of the real estate tax.'8°
Policy formulation of something so specific and controversial as the
recent federal jnvestment credit may be influenced somewhat by empiri-
cal research; but in what direction, it is difficult to say, in view of the
differences in the findings of various econometricians.19°
More influential, I suspect, have been the case studies on effects of
the income tax on the supply of labor, which—however lacking they
may have been in model construction and statistical testing—have, at
least, been reassuring in what they have failed to find, i.e., evidence that
changes in tax rates have reduced labor effort considerably.
Quantitative work on the other topics covered in this paper has
probably exerted little influence on policy. Time limitations prevent me
from documenting this assertion. Comparative studies, to be sure, are
apt to be of some influence, but more as ammunition to hold an already
fortified position than as a means of deciding what policy to adopt.
It can be argued that nonquantitative public finance, i.e., public
finance qualitative conclusions, or directional conclusions, have thus far
been more influential in guiding policy than have the quantitative studies
(apart from the numerous impact studies made within government
agencies, referred to above). This state of affairs, if I have diagnosed it
properly, may persist or change, or the entire question may vanish as we
see more clearly the need for theoretical and empirical work to advance
together. There is still plenty of room and need for both approaches—
and, especially, for coordination between them.
Seethe last three paragraphs in Section TI-B above.
190Seediscussion of econometric studies in Section lI-C (1) above.